




Department of Engineering and Safety 
The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil 
Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic 
The Establishment of an Arctic Oil Spill Regime 
— 
Ingvild Hoel Rise 
Master’s thesis in Societal Safety – Safety and Preparedness in the High North  
 








This is a case study of the establishment of an oil spill response regime in the Arctic region. 
The context is the work of the Arctic Council and the development of the Agreement on 
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. Three 
research topics are studied; regime, response system and the role of politics and professions. 
The Arctic oil spill response agreement is outlined first, and the principles, norms, rules and 
decision making procedures that it establishes for the oil spill response regime are analyzed.  
It is found that the Agreement mostly consists of principles and rules for procedures since it is 
a legal document; the Agreement is however creating a framework for the establishment of a 
regime. The second part is concerned about the response system. The bilateral and 
multilateral oil spill response agreements in the region are the fundament for the oil spill 
response in the Arctic (AC, 2013a: 11). For the regime to be successful it is important for 
these to be compatible (Tuler, Seager & Kay, 2007: 34). The agreements are analyzed with 
the use of elements from the command and control model and the problem solving model to 
evaluate to what extent they are compatible (Dynes, 1994). The problem solving model, from 
the chapter on response system, salutes cooperation between agencies and the personal 
contact which this type of cooperation encourage. So this might be seen as a positive feature 
of the Arctic Council’s institutional framework. The agreements are to a relatively large 
extent compatible. The most important deviations were the sign of centralization in the 
Canadian-Danish cooperation, and the emphasis on cooperation within research. The third 
part addresses the noteworthy presence of professionals in the development of the Agreement 
on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. Interview 
data and meeting reports form the empirical material for the analysis of the role of politics and 
professions in the regime formation. The regime is studied in three stages of regime 
formation; agenda formation, negotiation and operationalization (Young, 1998). While the 
political level found it necessary to develop an oil spill response regime after the Deepwater 
Horizon accident, the negotiation stage of the regime formation were a close cooperation 
between representatives from national ministries and of oil spill response experts. Further, it 
is the professional’s responsibility to prepare, recommend and maintain the development of 
the oil spill response agreements, operational guidelines, and contingency plans, and they are 
thereby to a large extent responsible for the operationalization of the regime. 
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The Arctic is not only the Arctic Ocean but also... the place 
where the Eurasian, North American, and Asia Pacific regions 
meet, where the frontiers come close to one another and the 
interests of states... cross 
The Arctic zone of Peace speech (Mikhail Gorbachev, 1987) 
1. Introduction 
Warmer climate and melting of the sea ice have made the Arctic more accessible for 
exploitation of natural resources, at the same time prolonging the season along the northern 
sea routes that makes the maritime activity in the area increase (Whiteman, Hope & 
Wadhams, 2013, 401-403). This creates prospects for further social and economic 
development in the region, but the growth in offshore and maritime activity will also represent 
a potential threat to the environment (Offerdal, 2007: 130). As a result, there has been a broad 
public and academic debate about the governance architecture for the Arctic region (Humrich, 
2013: 79). The recent development makes it increasingly difficult to ignore the need for an 
extended system for oil spill response (OSR) in the Arctic region. In May 2013 the member 
states of the Arctic Council (AC) signed the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil 
Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic
1
 (AC, 2013a). This agreement is the 
fundament for this thesis, as it seeks to establish an oil spill response regime for the whole 
circumpolar region. In addition, the pre-existing bilateral and multilateral
2
 agreements are 
important parts of the oil spill regime. Issues like oil spill preparedness in the arctic are clearly 
collective problems, and like many major policy challenges facing governments in the 21th 
century they call for joint solutions (Underdal, 2002: 3). However, even when it is known that 
effective solutions can only be achieved through joint efforts, it can be hard to establish and 
maintain cooperation among states (Ibid). This thesis takes a look at the establishment of an 
oil spill response regime in the Arctic and the cooperation leading to this establishment. 
1.1 Research Questions and Purpose of the Study 
With the high politics of the Arctic Council as context and the newly signed oil spill response 
agreement as a fundament the thesis strive to illustrate aspects connected to the establishment 
of oil spill response (OSR) systems in the Arctic. To contribute to the academic discussion 
surrounding collaboration in the Arctic and especially within the study of oil spill response 
                                                 
1
 From now referred to as the Agreement. 
2
 Bilateral agreements are between two parties, while multilateral are among several (Stokke, 2012: 97) 
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issues, it was necessary to make some choices of what elements to include and which ones to 
put aside. The topics and research questions that are included in this study are: 
1. Regime; what is the structure of the Agreement, what principles, norms, rules and 
decision making procedures dose it establish for the OSR regime? 
2. Response system; to what extent are the agreements under the Arctic OSR regime 
compatible? 
3. The role of politics and professions; to what extent are the political and 
professional representatives influencing different stages in the formation of the 
Agreement? 
Through the Agreement the Arctic states will establish an international regime which is 
understood as “[…] sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations” (Krasner 1983: 2). Regime theory is used as a framework for this study. 
International regimes may be understood with power-based, knowledge-based or interest-
based approaches (Hasenclever, Mayer & Rittberger, 1997: 1). Here it is taken an interest-
based approach to the oil spill response regime in the Arctic. Oil Spill Response (OSR) is 
understood in line of the definition of the International Maritime Organization (in Sydnes & 
Sydnes, 2013: 257) as “any action undertaken to prevent, reduce, monitor or combat oil 
pollution”. 
The Agreement is rooted in the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements and contingency 
plans on OSR among the Arctic states (AC, 2013a: 22). It was therefore found necessary to 
account for these to identify the response system. In OSR systems with several different 
agencies, such as national OSR authorities, it is crucial for the effective functioning that the 
agencies work together and are compatible (Tuler, Seager & Kay, 2007: 34).  In the theory 
chapter it is described to models of response systems; the command and control model and the 
problem solving model (Dynes, 1994). These are the fundament for the discussion of the 
Arctic OSR system. The study of the professional drivers for the cooperation is based on 
theory on professionalization of policy functions (Bell, 1985; Harrad & Mazzuchi, 1993; 
Young, 1998; Wilensky, 1964). This is a highly relevant topic in these types of institutions, 
were the expertise of the professionals are essential to the making of policy (Bell, 1985: 22). 
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During this work there have clearly been done delimitation of the topics for the thesis. There 
are numerous of topics that are interesting to study with regard to the establishment of an 
OSR regime in the Arctic. However, since the purpose of the thesis was to gain a better 
understanding of the OSR regime I found it natural to focus on three different topics instead 
of only one, and not more than three; to make the work load doable given the timeframe and 
limitations to length of the written product. The three topics are believed to be essential for 
the understanding of the process of establishing an OSR regime in the Arctic. 
1.2 Background and Context 
The Arctic region is currently experiencing a lot of changes (Dodds, 2012: 2). As an 
illustration of how fast these changes are developing we can to look to Kristine Offerdals 
work from 2007. She explores the question: “How prepared is the Arctic Council to address 
the environmental challenges connected to oil and gas developments in the Arctic, and what 
effects may be identified from this work?” (Offerdal, 2007:130). She writes about how 
modest the oil and gas activities still are and in her evaluation the Arctic Council scores rater 
low on effectiveness measures related to these issues. From 2007, when this was published, 
up until today it activity level in the petroleum industry has increased, at least in Norwegian 
and Russian areas, and within marine transport the activity are likely to expand as the sea ice 
melts (Whiteman, Hope & Wadhams, 2013, 401-403). At the same time we are observing 
major changes in the Arctic Council’s work with these concerns. First of all the member states 
of the Arctic Council have signed two legally binding agreements (Takei, 2013). One in May 
2011 on cooperation within search and rescue (SAR) in the Arctic
3
, and two years later, the 
member states signed the second binding agreement which is about OSR in the Arctic (Ibid). 
The Agreement is a result of the seventh ministerial meeting in the Arctic Council where they 
signed the 2011 Nuuk Declaration (AC, 2013a). Through the Nuuk Declaration the Arctic 
States decides to establish a Task Force to develop an international instrument on Arctic 
marine oil pollution preparedness and response (AC, 2011a: 4). Further in the declaration they 
call for the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) and the other relevant 
working groups to develop recommendations and best practices in the prevention of marine 
oil pollution (Ibid). The results were presented at the Ministerial meeting in 2013 and the 
Agreement was signed (AC, 2013a). To understand the formation of an Arctic OSR regime 
we need an explanation of the Arctic Council, and its Working Groups and the Task Forces. 
                                                 
3
 The agreement is entitled Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue in the Arctic. 
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1.2.1 The Arctic Council 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Arctic agenda shifted form the issues of the Cold 
War to initiatives to create regional cooperation (Young, 2012: 276). It is often referred to 
President Gorbachev’s Arctic zone of peace speech
4
 as a start of this new era where the 
creation of several regimes has taken place. The forerunner of the Arctic Council was created 
in 1991 when the five Nordic countries, the United States, Canada and the Russian Federation 
established an environmental cooperation called Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(AEPS) (Hønneland, 2005: 65). In 1996 the Arctic Council was formally established through 
the Ottawa Declaration as a: 
[…] high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, 
coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic 
Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular 
issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic (Arctic Council, 
2011b). 
The Council have eight member states; Denmark (Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Sweden, 
Canada, Norway, The Russian Federation, The United States of America, Iceland, and 
Finland (Ibid). The Arctic Council includes all states with territorial area in the Arctic region 
(Ibid). In addition to the member states there are six organizations of indigenous peoples who 
have the status as permanent members of the Arctic Council (Ibid). 
The Foreign Ministers of the eight Artic States meet every second year at the official meetings 
of the AC, while Senior Artic Officials (SAOs)
5
 meet more frequently for coordination and 
liaison (AC, 1996: 3). The responsibility for hosting ministerial meetings and providing the 
AC with a secretariat was initially rotated among the member states (Ibid). The chairmanship 
of the Artic Council is still rotated among the member states for a period of two years (AC, 
2011d), but since the activities of the AC have grown they have decided to establish a 
permanent secretariat in Tromsø, Norway (AC, 2012). The decisions of the Artic Council are 
made by consensus of the members (AC, 1996: 3). 
  
                                                 
4
 As cited in the beginning of this introduction. 
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Figure 1: The Arctic Council organizational chart. 
The Arctic Council is the main regional body involved in Arctic governance (Humrich, 2013: 
80). In principle the Council is set up to deal with all common Arctic issues, except matters 
related to security (Ibid). It has, as it should according to Christoph Humrich (2013: 93), been 
more focus on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the region. 
1.2.2 Working Groups 
The Arctic Council has several working groups within the organization who focuses on 
different areas of expertise. In this study it is interesting to take a closer look at the group who 
are working on questions related to emergency prevention preparedness and response, the 
EPPR. The EPPR Working Group was established to provide a framework for future 
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Forces working on specific 
issues for a limited time 
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Solsberg, West & McGrath, 1998: ii). Representatives from organizations in each of the arctic 
states form the working group (EPPR, 2014). Every two years it is elected a chair to lead the 
group (Ibid). The work of the group is mostly directed at assessing threats to the Arctic 
environment which could result in the need for emergency response measures, and at 
facilitating the improved capacity to prevent or diminish such threats (Owens et.al., 1998: ii). 
The group provides a forum for sharing experience and technical information within research 
and development information (Ibid). EPPR’s work include: organizing response exercises, 
preforming risk analyses, evaluating environmental agreements, assessing communication 
networks and warning systems (Ibid).  In addition to the member states and the permanent 
members, observer states are encouraged to contribute in the working groups (AC, 2011e). 
1.2.3. Task Forces 
In addition to the Working Groups the member states of the Arctic Council has established 
several Task Forces (AC, 2011c). Task Forces are appointed to work on specific issues for a 
limited time (Ibid). They are appointed by the ministers at the Ministerial Meetings, and are 
active until they have produced what they are asked for (Ibid). Both experts form the Working 
Groups and other national representatives from the member states form the Task Forces 
(Ibid). In the context of this study it is interesting to look closer at the Task Force on Arctic 
Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response
6
 which was established to develop an 
international instrument on Arctic marine oil pollution preparedness and response (AC, 
2011a: 4). The Task Force was co-chaired by Norway, Russia and the United States, and was 
appointed by the Ministerial Meeting in NUUK, Greenland in 2011 by recommendation of the 
SAOs (AC, 2013b). 
1.2.4 International Law 
In the background of the new agreement on cooperation in oil spill response in the Arctic 
there are several international agreements and constitutions. The Agreement highlights the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1990 International Convention on Oil 
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC), and the 1969 International 
Convention Relation to Intervention on the High Seas in Case of Oil Pollution Casualties 
(AC, 2013a). These are important frameworks for the establishment the OSR regime in the 
Arctic and are taken into account by the parties while creating the Agreement. 
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 From now referred to as the Task Force. 
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1.2.5 The Arctic 
 
Figure 2: Different definitions of the Arctic (AMAP, 1997: 6; AC, 2013a: art. 3). 
“The Arctic” is a geographical concept, but there are in fact several different definitions 
depending on what scientific functions they are meant to serve (Skagestad, 2010: 3). So, from 
an astronomical perspective, the Arctic covers the part of the Earth lying north of the Arctic 
Circle
7
 (Ibid). From a climatic perspective, the common definition includes lands and islands 
to the north of the northern limits of forests (the tree line) with constant permafrost and ocean 
areas to the north of southern limits of maximum occurrence of sea ice (Ibid). Another 
definition includes all areas to the north of a line on the map of the northern hemisphere with 
the July median temperature of +10° C or below at sea level (Ibid). The Arctic states OSR 
Agreement defines the geographical scope and areas of responsibility with different lines for 
each country (AC, 2013a). The Arctic’s unique topography leads to a number of 
environmental and operational challenges (Owens et.al., 1998: 2-4). Due to environmental 
challenges; extreme variations in ecological sensitivity, unique shore types (e.g. tundra, 
                                                 
7
 I. e. 66° 33’ N 
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glacier sidelines, and ice shelves), unique seasonal changes in the ocean and on shore, and 
longer persistence of spilled oil (Ibid). As of operational challenges: personnel safety in a 
remote and cold area, the temperature affects efficiency of personnel and equipment, the 
daylight varies greatly with the seasons, logistical response challenges due to remote 
locations, ice conditions, and a constant need for aircraft assistance to for logistics and 
monitoring (Ibid). 
1.3 The Thesis’ Structure 
The study has been organized in the following way. Chapter 2 begins by laying out the 
theoretical framework which the study is based on. The term ‘oil spill response’ is explained. 
Theory to understand the establishment of an oil spill response regime is outlined and the 
interest-based approach used in this study is accounted for (2.1). Section 2.2 presents two 
models for emergency response; the command and control model and the problem solving 
model, which is used in the study of the response system. Clarification on relevant theory on 
professionalization is given in section 2.3. To understand the dynamics of political and 
professional influence in the establishment of the OSR regime it is used theory on three stages 
of regime formation; agenda formation, negotiation and operationalization (Young, 1998). 
Chapter 3 deals with research metrology and describes; design, strategy, methods of data 
collection, how the evidence was analyzed, and assesses the validity and reliability of the 
study. In addition, it is accounted for implications and challenges who was experienced during 
the project. The main part of the thesis, chapter 4-6, is accompanied by the three research 
questions; regime (chapter 4), response system (chapter 5), and the role of politics and 
professions (chapter 6). These chapters include both empirical evidence and analyzes. Each 
chapter reviews the evidences and then discusses the empirical evidence up against the 
theoretical framework. In the end of the three chapters you will find a summary. Finally, the 





2. Theoretical Framework 
This study seeks to unite theory on international regimes with the context of preparedness and 
response within the division of oil spill emergencies. The Agreement is seen as a frame for the 
Oil Spill Response (OSR) regime in the Arctic, which is defined by the obligations in the 
Agreement and the Operational Guidelines, as well as the bilateral and multilateral 
agreements on OSR in the region. The purpose of the study is to get a better understanding of 
the Agreement and the link to the establishment of an Arctic oil spill response (OSR) regime 
by focusing on the three research topics introduced in the previous chapter; regime, response 
system, and the role of politics and professions. First it is accounted on the term Oil Spill 
Response systems. The chapter is thereby organized after each of the research topics. It gives 
an overview of relevant earlier research within these topics, while focusing on the theoretical 
background for the study. 
When using the term Oil Spill Response in this thesis it is understood as; “any action 
undertaken to prevent, reduce, monitor or combat oil pollution” (IMO in Sydnes & Sydnes, 
2013: 257). From this definition it is clear that we are dealing with a complex concept for two 
main reasons. First of all it is the time aspect; it includes efforts before, during, and after an 
oil spill emergency. And second, it contains a holistic aspect; it includes any action carried out 
in a given emergency situation. This gives an endless number of potential research topics. The 
term oil spill emergency response (OSER) has been used to define “the organizational 
structure responsible for providing oil spill emergency response” (Sydnes, 2011: 5). I have 
chosen to exclude “emergency” from the term because I find it excessive, and not necessary 
for an understanding of what we are talking about. This study uses the OSR term in 
connection with “system” and has used two models to explore what kind of assumptions the 
oil spill response regime are based upon. The models are described in section 2.3. 
2.1 International Regimes 
An international regime is in this study understood as; “[…] sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 1983: 2). This definition implies 
that regimes have both a substantive (principles and norms) and operative (rules and 
procedures) component (Sydnes & Sydnes, 2013: 258). Stephen D. Krasner (1983: 2) defines 
the principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures as; “principles are beliefs of fact, 
causation, and rectitude”; “norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and 
11 
 
obligations”; “rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action”; and “decision 
making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice”. 
As mentioned in the introduction, most of the states in the world today find it necessary to 
cooperate with other states to accomplish common tasks. Some may argue that the 
international system in a globalized world requires cooperation to maintain development pace 
and stability. Every so often a new international, multilateral or bilateral agreement appears, 
and some participants experiences considerable success with such collaboration regimes. 
Political scientists who belong to realist tradition (e.g. Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 1994; 
Morgenthau, 1956), on the other hand, argue that it is hard for states to cooperate due to the 
anarchic structure for the international system. The Arctic is by some seen as a potential 
conflict area due to its lack of governance. Articles from journals and the media raises 
important questions and has suggested several more or less frightening scenarios for the future 
Arctic; “Who owns the Arctic?” (Graff, 2007) in Time Magazine; “The next land rush” 
(Cressey, 2008) in Nature; “A very cold war for energy resources” in the Russian 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta in 2008; “Arctic meltdown: The economic and security implications of 
global warming” (Borgerson, 2008) in Foreign Affairs; “Why a warmer Arctic needs new 
laws” (Wade, 2008) in The Financial Times. These articles share the premise that we are in 
for a period of growing conflict in the area as a result of the search for oil and gas, and the 
competing juridical claims from the Arctic states (Young, 2009: 73). The views on the future 
of the Arctic vary from violent conflict for resources to more optimistic projections of 
peaceful solutions of circumpolar governance (Haftendorn, 2010: 809). To cope with such 
potential conflicts it has been suggested certain types of soft solutions to enable competing 
states to desist from using military force, or threatening with the use of such means, and 
allowing the states to reach compromise instead (Ibid: 811). Many of those concerned with 
the governance of the Arctic region have reached the conclusion that the solution is to create a 
new regime for the Arctic expressed by one legally binding treaty (Young, 2009: 75). Oran R. 
Young (2009; 2012) is however suggesting an approach to develop what he calls a regime 
complex in the Arctic. This is a collection of “[…] non-hierarchically related governance 
arrangements (often called elements or elemental regimes) that deal with various aspects of a 
recognized issue domain or spatially-defined area […]” (Young, 2012: 289). A number of 
issue-specific regimes have been developed that defines governance in the Arctic e.g. on 
Spitsbergen, climate change, ozone layers, search and rescue, Polar Code of commercial 
shipping, and on conservation of polar bears and management of caribou (Ibid: 291).  
12 
 
Although these regimes are self-contained, they may start to look like elements of a larger 
regime complex in the Arctic (Ibid). The OSR Agreement studied in this thesis may become a 
part of the regime complex Young (2012) is outlining for the future of Arctic governance. 
Neo-liberals, like Young, argue that the international collaboration regimes to some degree 
regulate the interaction between states (Inderberg, 2007:11), and that strong mutual interest 
always has been a solid base for cooperation (Haftendorn, 2010:823). It is an interest-based 
theory (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997: 26). On the other hand, John Mearshimer 
(1994), who belongs to realist tradition, criticizes regime theory for painting a rosy picture of 
international affairs, and points to the insufficient attention to territory struggles and conflict 
of interests. This is power-based theory (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997: 26).  
Regime theory is originally made to explain the establishment, change and variations in 
regime efficiency (Ibid: 13), and there has been an extensive focus on efficiency in studies of 
international environmental regimes
8
. This study does not seek to evaluate the regime’s 
efficiency since it is not reasonable to draw conclusions on efficiency of a regime based in an 
agreement which has yet to be ratified. In this case, regime theory is rather used as a 
framework for the case-study and helps to explain what we are talking about when identifying 
the elements of an oil spill response regime. It is with an interest-based approach the regime is 
studied in this thesis. The assumption is that mutual interest of establishing a regime for 
marine oil pollution preparedness and response among the member states of the Arctic 
Council led to the signing of Agreement. 
When studying these issues, it is natural to seek to the literature on existing OSR regimes to 
search for something that might be seen as an ideal for an OSR regime. The Agreement builds 
largely on the already existing bilateral and multilateral agreements on OSR in the Arctic, and 
one bilateral agreement who is known to have been quite successful is the one between 
Norway and the Russian Federation on OSR in the Barents Sea
9
. By building mutual trust and 
confidence Norway and the Russian Federation has concluded various agreements within 
several different sectors e.g. fisheries, nuclear waste removal, and oil spill response 
(Haftendorn, 2013: 823). The Norwegian-Russian agreement on OSR is further elaborated on 
in chapter five together with the rest of the bilateral and multilateral agreements and 
contingency plans among Arctic states. The issues surrounding regime theory is studied, 
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through the research question: what is the structure of the Agreement, what principles, norms, 
rules and decision making procedures dose it establish for the OSR regime?, in chapter four 
by looking at the elements in the text of the Agreement. 
2.2 Response System 
The dawn of modern governmental planning and response activities came in the aftermath of 
the Torrey Canyon oil spill off the coast of Great Britain on March 3, 1967 (Walker et. al, 
1994: 23). The incident acquired worldwide attention and got many countries to begin 
working with oil spill as specific regulatory issues at a national level (Ibid). Internationally, it 
is challenging to develop and implement an effective oil spill response system due to 
technological, political, economic and socio-cultural differences between organizations and 
nations (Walker et. al, 1994: 8). This can best be accomplished through a preparedness 
process where the parties reach agreements among members of the response community on 
how they will respond jointly, and by modifying those agreements as it is gained new 
knowledge and experience from response operations and exercises (Ibid). 
In the literature on emergency response and crisis management there are descriptions of 
different models that try to create an ideal for planning (Dynes, 1994; Schneider, 1992; Neal 
& Phillips, 1995; Perry & Lindell, 2003). One of the most common models is the command 
and control model (Dynes, 1994: 141).  
The command and control model has its roots in the post-world war II era and has been 
described as the “military model” (Dynes, 1994: 141-142; Walker et. al, 1994; 23). When the 
possibility of enemy attack declined former military officials became more involved in 
emergency planning and brought with them experience and competence from their military 
career (Ibid: 143). Central to the model is the theory of the three C’s; Chaos, Command and 
Control (Ibid: 142). Because of the assumption that emergencies lead to chaos among 
civilians, in the population in general and among the employees in emergency organizations, 
it is necessary with para-military organizations that can eliminate the chaos by implementing 
command and control (Ibid:142, 146). It is assumed total societal breakdown, weakened 
authority, and therefore a need for strong leadership (Neal & Phillips, 1995: 327). One aspect 
that is seen as a real and serious problem is the potential loss of manpower in emergency 
organizations, and this is solved by relying heavily on para-military organizations like police 
forces or fire brigades (Dynes, 1994: 148). 
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The command and control model has, according to Dynes (1994: 148), some key assumptions 
with implications for contingency planning. It is assumed that social chaos will emerge during 
an emergency, and social structures will have reduced capacity to cope with the unexpected 
situation (Ibid). Therefore, the command and control model finds it necessary to create 
artificial structures to deal with this reduced capacity (Ibid). It expresses a distrust of 
individuals and structures to make intelligent decisions during emergencies (Ibid). The 
responsibility is being placed in a top down structure of authority to make the right decisions 
(Ibid). Finally, this result in a closed system intended to overcome the inherent weakness of 
civil society to deal with emergencies (Ibid). 
The command and control model is much debated by scientists the resent decades and is, by 
some, seen as inadequate and dysfunctional based on knowledge of behavior in emergencies 
(Dynes, 1994: 141). Command and control approaches to emergency management will 
generally lead to ineffective response operations (Neal & Phillips, 1995: 327). It is built on 
disaster myths and neglects documented characteristics of behavior (Ibid: 333). It has 
therefore been suggested a variety of models to replace the command and control model
10
. 
The problem solving presented by Russell R. Dynes (1994) is one of these, and the one this 
study focus on as a counter to the command and control model. The problem solving model 
does not require a top-down, highly controlled and centralized organization (Dynes, 1994: 
156). Since this is not effective in normal day-to-day operations, there is no reason to expect it 
to be effective in emergency situations (Ibid). 
The problem solving model is on the other hand more adequate and have a more realistic set 
of assumptions based on emergency research rather than military analogies (Ibid: 141, 149). It 
sets three different C’s as conditions for contingency planning; continuity, coordination and 
cooperation (Ibid: 141). Dynes (1994: 149) explains the problem solving model with different 
assumptions than the command and control model. It is acknowledged that emergencies may 
create some confusion and disorganization at the level of routine patterns, but the problem 
solving model finds it incorrect to describe this as social chaos (Ibid). Emergencies do not 
reduce the capacities of individuals or social structures, but they may present unexpected 
problems that need to be solved (Ibid). The existing social structure is the most effective way 
to solve such problems; it is neither possible nor effective to create an artificial structure 
(Ibid).  To make rational and informed decisions; the planning efforts should be built around 
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 E. g. the problem solving model (Dynes, 1994), the emergent human recourses model (Neal &Phillips, 1995), 
the rational model (Siegel, 1985) and the expert judgment model (Harrald & Mazzuchi, 1993) 
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the capacity of social units, who needs to be seen as resources for problem solving not as the 
problem itself (Ibid). An emergency is by its nature characterized by decentralized decision 
making so this should be valued rather than centralization of authority (Ibid). The solution is 
to create an open system that emphasizes on flexibility and initiative among the various social 
units (Ibid). The goal should be orientated towards solving problems rather than avoiding 
social chaos. 
The problem solving model focuses on continuity instead of chaos (Ibid: 150). The idea of 
continuity is based on the fact that what people do before an emergency is the best indication 
of what the same people will do during an emergency (Neal & Phillips, 1995: 332). Since 
people normally behave in terms of certain routines, those routines should be used when 
planning emergency actions (Dynes, 1994: 150). While the command and control model finds 
it necessary to make decisions for “victims”, the problem solving model do not assume that 
the population have lost their decision making capacity and concentrates on how to develop 
ways to enhance an collective decision making process (Ibid). 
Coordination is another focus of the problem solving model (Ibid). The best way to uphold 
authority during an emergency will be to not create an artificial authority structure, but the 
“pre-emergency authority” will serve as the best base of the emergency authority (Ibid). 
Coordination can further be enhanced by implementing common planning and exercise 
activities, by establishing personal contacts, develop liaison activities, and establish shared 
facilities for emergency operations (Ibid). It is acknowledged that authority may change 
during an emergency and that the pre-emergency patterns may not be carried out as planned 
(Ibid: 151). The coordination should, however, maintain flexibility so that new elements can 
be included when needed (Ibid). Even the most worked through contingency plan is unlikely 
to anticipate all of the required action during an incident (Neal &Phillips, 1995: 334). There is 
no such thing as a perfect contingency plan or oil spill response (Ibid: 335). It should 
therefore be planned to include ad hoc configurations during a response to adapt to the 
changing emergency situation (Ibid). 
Cooperation is the third C of the problem solving model, replacing control (Dynes, 1994: 
150). In the command and control model there is a concern that the emergency organizations 
will not be able to operate because their employees would be traumatized and affected by 
conflicting roles between work and family (Ibid: 153). Role abandonment is however 
suggested to be a non-problem in a study which examined the behavior of 443 emergency 
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personnel (Dynes, 1987 in Dynes 1994: 153). The planning process should, rather than focus 
on control, focus on ways to effectively relocate human and material resources (Ibid: 155). 
From this review of the two models it is drawn variables for the purpose to analyze the 
bilateral and multilateral oil spill agreements and contingency plans in the Arctic. It is chosen 
to focus on the following eleven variables: notification, exchange of information, assistance, 
competent national authorities, flexible authority structure, joint contingency plan, joint 
exercises, personal contact, liaison activities, effective relocation of resources, and shared 
facilities. 
The Agreement will guide the revision of the regional oil spill arrangements and seek to 
gather them all to establish an oil spill response regime for the Arctic region (AC, 2013a: 11). 
Between the regional OSR regimes and the Agreement it would most likely be found some 
sort of regime interplay, i.e. “ deliberate efforts by states and others to shape the effects of one 
institution on the contents, operation, or consequences of another” (Oberthür & Stokke, 2011 
in Stokke, 2012: 3). Institutional interplay is not in focus in this study, but it is important to 
bear in mind that although the bilateral and multilateral arrangements are analyzed as separate 
units, they are pieces of the OSR system in the Arctic region. To what extent the agreements 
are compatible will affect the success of the OSR system as a whole (Tuler, Seager & Kay, 
2007: 34).  
In chapter five these models are used to answer the question: to what extent are the 
agreements under the Arctic OSR regime compatible? The analysis uses the variables form 
the command and control, and the problem solving models as tools to compare the different 
agreements and evaluate to what extent they are compatible. 
2.3 The Role of Politics and Professions 
As the theory on international regimes stated; these regimes are in many cases driven by 
interests-based and political forces, and develops through negotiated changes as the parties 
identify common interests over time (Young, 2009; Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 
1997). Therefore, it is interesting to study an international regime that is so closely linked to 
the operative aspects of oil spill response. Oran R. Young (1998: 4) divides the formation of 
international regimes into three stages: the agenda formation stage, the negotiation stage, and 
the operationalization stage. While issues may be hard for policymakers to ignore, as oil spill 
response after the Torrey Canyon oil spill referred to earlier, the emergence of issues on the 
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international political agenda are usually political processes themselves (Young, 1998: 4; 
Walker et. al, 1994: 23). Issues often make their way onto the agenda when states or other 
actors adopt them and push them to be prioritized (Young, 1998: 7). Before the next stage of 
regime creation practical matters has to be accounted for, like identification of stakeholders to 
include, setting of the negotiation, timing of the first round, and remaining questions like the 
scope of the negotiation (Ibid: 9-10). The creation of an international regime is almost every 
time the result of negotiation among a group of actors seeking to reach an agreement (Lipson, 
1991 in Young, 1998: 11). The participants may not share all goals so informal deals and 
tactics are often used to reach an agreement (Young, 1998: 11). […] the institutional 
bargaining characteristics of the negotiation stage of regime formation aims at building 
consensus among as many participants as possible rather than putting together winning 
coalitions” (Young, 1998: 13). In the negotiation of the oil spill response agreement it was 
used consensus based decision making like the one described here by Young (1998). 
Agreements at the international level are open to a variety of interpretations, and the 
operational content of the regime becomes a matter to be clarified through practice (Ibid: 11). 
The operationalization stage is therefore a critical stage in regime creation (Spector & Korula, 
1993 in Young, 1998: 15). 
John R. Harrad and Thomas Mazzuchi (1993) have identified methods for using experts in 
contingency planning. They find it interesting that the experts are sensitive to issues that 
typically are not considered in planning processes (Ibid: 195). One relevant consideration is 
the involvement of key stakeholders (Ibid). The use of expert opinions in the assessment of 
rare events are common within a variety of fields such as military intelligence, aerospace 
programs, nuclear engineering, in addition to safety and reliability analyzes, and political 
analysis (Ibid). A lot of research has been done generally on the relation between politics and 
professions. Robert Bell (1985) discusses professional values in relation to organizational 
decisional making. While organizations coordinate activities on the behalf of socially 
approved goals, professionals have a more narrowed vision because they are socialized into a 
commitment to professional values, such as; health, justice or knowledge (Ibid: 21, 56). “The 
professional man adheres to a set of professional norms”, (Wilensky, 1964: 138). In addition, 
this socialization encourages professionals to believe that these values should only be 
accomplished through the use of professional expertise (Bell, 1985: 56). Organizations that 
combine technical and policymaking functions often find it necessary to hire professionals to 
acquire technical and other types of expertise (Ibid: 22). However, by hiring expertise these 
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organizations strengthen the policy impact of professional values (Ibid). On the controversy, 
this threat is not as radical when organizational purposes and professional values are closely 
linked (Ibid). A major challenge for organizations of this kind is, according to Bell (1985: 23), 
to maintain the integrity of organizational purposes while making use of professional 
expertise by integrating the professional values that comes with the experts. To explain how 
these professional values comes into play Bell (1985: 30) highlights how budget examiners 
(professional level) perform policy functions like; analyze merits, prepare material for the 
director and the president (the political level), and make policy recommendations. Harold L. 
Wilensky (1964: 141) finds the technical service ideal as an important professional value. The 
degree of professionalization is found in this ideal, and there are two norms a professional has 
to follow to obtain this ideal; “do what you can to maintain professional standards of work” 
(Wilensky, 1964: 141), and; “be aware of the limited competence of your own specialty 
within the profession, honor the claims of other specialties, and be ready to refer clients to a 
more competent colleague” (Wilensky, 1964: 141). Wilensky (1964: 158) finds what he calls 
program professionals in the bureaucracy in the U.S. in the 1960s. This is a specialist who is 
not only committed to his professional values, but is equally committed to particular programs 
and policies. By the virtue of his expertise he makes himself essential as a policy advisor 
(Ibid). This might be just as relevant today and in the context of the Agreement and the Arctic 
Council. We know that the organization have both a professional level and a political level 
that both contribute to policymaking. 
In chapter six it is taken a closer look at these issues in connection to the Arctic states’ OSR 
regime through the questions; to what extent are the political and professional representatives 
influencing different stages in the formation of the Agreement? Though interview data was the 
most important source of data for the analysis in this chapter, some reports from the EPPR 
meetings also gave essential information about the cooperation. The chapter is structured after 





In this chapter it is given a clarification of all the choices made regarding research design and 
methods. The chapter provides a presentation of the data collection methods; document study, 
interview by correspondence, and group interview, as well as the study’s validity and 
reliability. Above all, most choices were made for the purpose to make me able to answer the 
research questions in the best possible way, although some of the choices were also made to 
make the study doable given the time frame. 
3.1 Research Strategy and Choice of Case 
This thesis is designed as an embedded single-case study; this was considered to be the 
natural choice due to the complexity and scope of the case. While the study as a whole 
focuses on one case, the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness 
and Response in the Arctic, the three research questions focuses on different units; the regime, 
the response system, and the political and professional representatives’ influence in the 
process creating of the Agreement. Such projects are known to be embedded single-case 
studies; it is one case with several different units of analysis (Yin, 2014: 55). A single case-
study can contribute to knowledge creation by challenging, confirming or extending the 
existing theory (Ibid: 51). 
Because it offers freedom to work with data collection and analysis as the project progresses it 
is chosen to use a stepwise deductive inductive strategy (Tjora, 2010: 102). This is 
appropriate since the empirical sections are diverse, and different parts will be at unlike stages 
at the same time. The empirical chapters and analysis parts in this thesis are structured after 
the research questions, which made it possible to complete the analysis in the first parts before 
the data for the last question was gathered. This was very convenient as the gathering of 
interview data for the last question took time. 
The choice of the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic as a study object was done for three reasons. First, it is exciting to 
study cooperation where politics and technical expertise are so closely linked as in OSR 
regime in the Arctic. Second, the development in the Arctic region has high importance in 
current international relations and for the national interest of the Arctic states. Finally, the 
work within oil spill response is urgent as the region develops and the activity increases. 
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3.2 Data Collection 
The data used in the study is qualitative and primarily gathered through documents and other 
written material. In addition to document studies, interviews were used to gather data that 
were hard to find in text based sources. Documents are a type of data that Norman Blaikie 
(2010: 22) calls social artefacts. This type of data does not come directly from individuals; 
they are traces or products that individuals and groups leave behind, directly or indirectly, 
resulting from their natural setting (Ibid). Data from the interviews are a study of a semi-
natural setting; the informants were interviewed about the activities and opinions in the 
organization i.e. their natural setting (Blaikie: 2010: 22). 
The three research topics have to a large extent the same purpose; to help us better understand 
the OSR regime which is being established in the Arctic. It is used two methods of data 
collection; document study and interview. The reason for this is the diversity of the three 
research questions. The first two questions (regime and response system) are concerned about 
demands and guidelines which are best fined in normative sources like laws and regulations 
(Holme & Solvang, 1996: 120). Concerning the last question (role of politics and professions) 
it was required to find answers in cognitive sources, like interview, since it is a question of 
how different actors contribute to the development (Ibid). 
3.2.1 Document Study 
In addition to interviews and observation are documents often used as sources in case studies 
(Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 56). Since there are three different questions it was necessary 
to use different types of documents. The documents are listed in appendix I. Question number 
one (Regime) is answered with the use of the text in the Agreement and its appendices in 
addition to information about the Arctic Council’s institutional framework. The second 
question (Response System) is answered by using the existing bilateral and multilateral 
agreements on OSR in the Arctic. A list of these is provided in chapter five in this study in 
addition to the overall list in appendix I. The documents for the last question, on the role of 
politics and professions in the regime formation, were from meetings and other reports form 
the EPPR working group. When studying documents it is central to highlight that there is no 
understanding outside of history; as a researcher you cannot step out of your social world or 
the historical context in which you live (Blaikie, 2010: 99). When we are studying text based 
material we do it in our own world at our time in history, and different interpreters at different 
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times are likely to create different understandings (Ibid: 101). All documents used are 
publically available through the Arctic Council homepage. 
3.2.2 Interview Inquiry Form 
For the analysis of the third research question interview data is used to supply the text based 
material. Most interview data was gathered by e-mail correspondence, in addition to one 
group interview. The interview data gathered by e-mail correspondence was rather a 
collection method in-between focused interviews and questionnaires. The data is strictly 
qualitative therefore I have chosen to use the term interview inquiry form, instead of 
questionnaire for the collection method. The interview inquiry form was formed as focused 
interview (see Yin, 2014: 112). In qualitative research it is important to use open ended 
questions (Jacobsen, 2000: 115). One benefit from this method is differentiated answers from 
the informants (Ibid). 
The decision to use an inquiry form for the gathering of interview data was done for four 
reasons; first and foremost to give the analysis more weight, compared to just using text based 
material. Second, the theme did not require an extensive questioning of the informants as the 
publicly available documents gave en considerable amount of data. Third, given the 
informants high level of seniority it would most likely been hard to recruit them for hour-long 
interviews. It was also desired to reach informants over a wide geographical range, which was 
considered to be easier by using e-mail correspondence than other means of communications. 
The interview inquiry form had eight open ended questions, and was sent out by e-mail 
individually to each informant
11
. The questions were done in English to all the informants, but 
when I followed up on the ones that didn’t answer the first time; they were given the 
opportunity to answer in Swedish, Danish or Norwegian as well. This resulted in more 
responses.  
3.2.3 Focused Group Interview 
Interviews are essential sources of data in case study research (Yin, 2014: 113). One focused 
group interview was conducted during the project. The questions were based on the interview 
inquiry form presented earlier, while adding some points to direct the discussion during the 
interview. In focused group interviews the researcher will moderate a discussion around some 
aspect of the study (Yin, 2014, 112). Initially the empirical material for the thesis was not 
planned to include face-to-face interviews since it was assumed that the document study and 
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the interview inquiry forms would generate more than enough data for the accomplishment of 
the study. While later it was realized that the reports form the meetings in the Task Force 
were confidential and not accessible for the public or me as a scientist. The need for 
additional interview data emerged and luckily one informant volunteered to arrange for me to 
meet this individual and two colleges, therefore it was decided to perform one group 
interview. The interview lasted for 75 minutes and it was taken handwritten notes rather than 
using a voice recorder because it was convenient in the interview situation. 
All informants were selected on the basis of their roll within main organizations related to the 
Arctic Council’s work on marine oil pollution preparedness and response in the Arctic, and 
were consequently what we call key informants. Each informant was encouraged to help me 
get in contact with other informants; a so-called snowball sampling (Atkinson & Flint 2001: 
2) to further reach more desired informants. Potential informants from the eight Arctic 
countries were contacted by e-mail. Replies from the delegations of Canada, Norway, Russia 
and Finland are used in this study. In addition to informants who were directly involved on 
the Task Force or the EPPR it was interviewed one academic informant which had knowledge 
of the work of one delegation and the work of the EPPR Working Group. Informant 4, 5 and 6 
were interviewed together in a group interview, while the remaining interviews are from e-
mail correspondence. The informants are listed in table 1. 
Table 1: List of informants 
Role Entity Code 
OSR expert EPPR/Task Force INF 1 
Academic Observer INF 2 
Head of delegation Task Force INF 3 
Head of delegation Task Force INF 4 
Member of delegation Task Force INF 5 
Member of delegation Task Force INF 6 
Member of delegation Task Force INF 7 
 
3.3 Analyzing Evidence 
As mentioned earlier; the chapters on empirical evidence and analysis have been structured 
after the three research questions. In chapter 4 it is used Stephen Krasner’s (1982) definition 
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on international regime to outline what principles, norms, rules and decision making 
procedures the Agreement establish for the OSR regime in the Arctic. This is analyzed to 
explain the case. When analyzing the second question variables were used to help organize 
the extensive data material and to conduct a productive analysis. Variables are features of the 
unit that is analyzed (Andersen, 2013: 40). The variables facilitates for illustration of the 
findings in table 3, this was considered to be beneficial both for the reader and when doing the 
analysis. The last question relies heavily on interview data. It was chosen to use Oran R. 
Young’s (1998) theory of regime formation to structure the evidence. This was a useful tool 
to organize the empirical evidence, while it helped to highlight important aspects of the 
findings; the roles of politics and professions in different stages of a regime formation. The 
analysis used the extended theory on professionalization as a base, and was structured 
chronologically like the stages of regime formation in Young (1998). 
3.4 Validity and reliability 
3.4.1 Validity 
Construct validity is secured by using multiple sources (Yin, 2014: 45). By using both 
documents and interview to collect the empirical material it is done a data triangulation (Ibid: 
120). The use of multiple sources of evidence allows the study to address a broad range of 
issues (Ibid: 120). The first research question uses only one document, which is justified by 
the aim of the research question itself; describing the principles, norms, rules and decision 
making procedures of the Agreement. 
Since the first research question is descriptive internal validity is not a matter of discussion 
(Ibid: 46). Internal validity is secured in the second part by using rival explanations based on 
theories of the command and control model and the problem solving model (Ibid: 45). In the 
third part the analytical method of explanation building is used based on the three stages of 
regime formation (Young, 1998). This helps to secure the internal validity (Yin, 2014: 45). 
Although the bias of the interview material is a threat to the internal validity (Ibid: 47). 
Clearly there are given some “correct” answers through the interview collection. Most 
informants are bureaucrats working in an environment of political bias, and this is reflected in 
some of the answers. The biases of the interview material are important to be aware of when 
reading chapter six. 
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When clarifying external validity or generalizability it is important to point out that it is not 
possible to generalize these findings empirically, but it is nevertheless interesting to link this 
case to a bigger picture. In the research community, it is regularly expected that the purpose 
of research is to produce formal generalizations that can be used by other researchers to guide 
their own work in their own particular situations (Stake & Trumbull, 1982: 2). “Research 
leads to knowledge which leads to improved practice” (Ibid). When Ed Short reviewed the 
impact of research in education he found that: “A number of researchers have redefined the 
scope of the phenomena and have conceived it, not as a problem of 'research into practice,' but 
as one of 'knowledge production and knowledge utilization" (in Stake & Trumbull, 1982: 2). 
The scope of this study is to reach new understanding; i.e. naturalistic generalizations (Ibid: 
1). It do exist quantitative studies of international environmental regimes which is more 
comprehensive to say something general about this as a phenomenon. Some of the leading 
scholars within the field are working to create a database which will make it easier to do 
generalizable studies on regimes
12
. This study is on the other hand a single-case study and the 
conclusions may therefore not be generalizable empirically to other cases (Yin, 2014, 48). It is 
nonetheless, possible to generalize analytically as the use of theory is enhanced by the 
empirical findings (Ibid: 41). The use of theoretical concepts through this thesis makes this 
possible. 
3.4.2 Reliability 
The aim reliability is to be sure that if another researcher follows the same procedures as 
described here and conducts the same case study one more time, the later researcher should 
conclude with the same findings as this study (Yin, 2014: 48). If this project had been 
conducted by another researcher and used the same sources and where asking the same 
questions (and were doing it at the same time in history); it is quite possible that the empirical 
findings would be the same.  
3.5 Implications and Challenges 
Some challenges were experienced during the course of this project. It is easy to say that if I 
had known what I know now six mounts ago the time spent on the project would probably 
been half. It is reasonable to address the implications and challenges in line with the three 
research questions. The first part was mostly explicit since it is a descriptive part. The 
categorization of principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures would have been 
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 See Breitmeier, Young & Zürn (2006).  
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easier if there were used more and different sources. Assessing the norms of the regime was 
hard without observation or interview data. During the investigation of the second question it 
emerged an implication with one agreement that was only available in Finnish and Russian, 
the solution was to cut the agreement from the material and refrain from using it in the 
analysis. Two of the agreements used are not available in English, but since I am a native 
Norwegian speaker it did not make any complications to translate the material for the study 
and work with data in Norwegian. Another aspect worth mentioning is the fact that the 
response system in the Arctic are based on each national contingency plan and response 
system in the eight Arctic states. Ideally one should investigate the national systems in each 
state as well as the contingency plans, and bilateral and multilateral agreements. In connection 
to the last question is was experienced two challenges; when gathering interview data, and 
when it was discovered that the reports from the meetings in the Task Force was withheld 
from public insight. The former challenge was resolved by conducting a group interview of 
members of one of the national delegations. The gathering of interview data from all over the 
circumpolar world was resolved by using internet as the main communication channel. It took 
time before all the material was collected, and it was necessary to remind the required 
informants to respond, but after all it was a satisficing number of respondents in time for the 
analysis. The research questions have been modified during the course of the project, 
therefore are the research questions described for the informants different than the ones in the 
final thesis. It has not been done major changes, so this is not considered to have implications 





In this chapter the structure of the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution 
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic is reviewed. The principles, norms, rules and 
decision making procedures are identified to give a better understanding of the OSR regime 
which is been created in the Arctic. This is connected to the first of the three research 
questions; what is the structure of the Agreement, what principles, norms, rules and decision 
making procedures dose it establish for the OSR regime? The research question is descriptive 
in its nature, and it is therefore presented a description of the Agreement and its content. First, 
in this chapter, the structure of the actual Agreement is described in three parts; framework 
section, operational section, and administrative section. This division is made to get a better 
overview of the elements in the Agreement. These findings are then analyzed with connection 
to regime theory in the analysis part. 
 
Figure 3: Entities within the Arctic Council with influence on the development and 
management of the Agreement. 
Institutionally the Arctic Council has a political level, with the Ministerial Meetings, and a 
professional level with the Working Groups. As brought up in the introduction; the member 
countries of the Arctic Council decided to create an international instrument on Arctic marine 
oil pollution preparedness and response (AC, 2013a). This instrument was developed and 
negotiated in a group outside of the Council itself, the Task Force, which consisted of national 
delegations from the eight Arctic countries and groups of permanent participants, observers 
and experts
13
. The Task Force created the Agreement which is outlined and discussed here. 
This is important to bear in mind as the institutional framework of the Arctic Council is the 
foundation for the establishment of the OSR regime in the Arctic. 
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Pollution Preparedness and 
Response (temporarily and not 
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The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the 
Arctic (AC, 2013a) has 23 articles that are divided into three different sections here; article 1-
3 is the framework of the agreement where the objective, terms and geographical scope is 
defined; in article 4-13 and 21 operational aspects are settled; and articles 13-20, 22 and 23 
are dealing with administrative issues. Section number two is naturally the most interesting 
when looking at the OSR system. The issues related more specific to the response system in 
the Arctic are taken a closer look at in the next chapter. 
4.1 Framework Section 
The framework of the agreement is outlined in the first three articles where the objective, 
terms and geographical scope are defined. The objective of the agreement is to “[…] 
strengthen cooperation and mutual assistance among the Parties on oil pollution preparedness 
and response in the Arctic in order to protect the marine environment from pollution by oil” 
(Ibid: art. 1). The terms defined are oil, oil pollution incident and ship (Ibid: art. 2). Oil is 
understood as “[…] petroleum in any form including crude oil, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse and 
refined products” (AC, 2013a: art. 2). An oil pollution incident is; 
[…] an occurrence or series of occurrences having the same origin, which results or may result 
in a discharge of oil and which poses or may pose a threat to the marine environment, or to the 
coastline or related interests of one or more states, and which requires emergency action or 
other immediate response (AC, 2013a: art. 2). 
A ship is a “[…] vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and 
includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, and floating craft of any type” 
(AC, 2013a: art. 2). The section defines the parties and the areas of responsibility. The 
Agreement applies to any marine area in the sovereign and juridical region of the Arctic states 
above a southern limit that is set differently in each country (Ibid: art. 3.1). Further it applies 
to the areas beyond the jurisdiction of any state above this southern limit to the extent 
consistent with international law (Ibid: art. 3.2). Figure 4 illustrates the geographical scope of 
the Agreement and the AMAP definition of Arctic. The boundary is the same as the AMAP 
boundary (except it applies only to marine areas) in Denmark (Greenland and Faroe Islands), 
Iceland and the USA. In Canada it is set at 60˚ north, in Norway at 66˚ north (the Arctic 
Circle), in the Russian Federation it follows the coastlines of the White Sea, the Barents Sea, 
the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea and the Chukchi Sea (and the mouths of 




Figure 4: Boundaries of the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution 
Preparedness and Response (AMAP, 2014; AC, 2013a: art. 3). 
4.2 Operational Section 
This section is the main body of the agreement, and gives account for the operational aspects 
of the regime. The articles here include demands for national procedures that have to be 
completed for the Agreement to enter into force (Ibid: art. 22.2). This means that the 
agreement is not ratified before the depository has received notification of finalization of 
these national procedures (Ibid). 
The demand for national systems for oil pollution preparedness and response is accounted for 
(Ibid: art. 4). It requires that the national system involves plans and communication 
capabilities, and a mechanism for coordination of the response to an oil pollution incident, 
with the ability to mobilize the necessary resources (Ibid). Article 5 introduces the demand for 
29 
 
operational contact points (Ibid). Each national system shall establish one or several of these 
contact points and operate them at all time (Ibid). The main responsibility for the contact 
points is to receive and transmit oil pollution reports (Ibid: art. 5b). Contact information for 
the parties’ national 24-hour operational contact points are provided in an appendix of the 
Agreement (Ibid: 4-6). Additionally, it shall be designated a competent national authority with 
responsibility for oil pollution preparedness and response (Ibid: art. 5a). 
Further, an algorithm for the oil spill response is outlined. When a party is notified of oil 
pollution or possible oil pollution it shall find out whether it is an oil spill incident, assess 
possible sources, extent, potential consequences, and the nature in the area (Ibid: art. 6.1a, b). 
Then inform all states whose interest may be affected by the incident, and give updates 
accordingly until the response is concluded or joint action is decided (Ibid: art 6.1c). All the 
parties shall be notified of severe oil spills (Ibid: art. 6.2). Monitoring to discover new spills 
or observe an existing incident shall be carried out, also in cooperation with other parties 
when this is appropriate (Ibid: art. 7). The party may request the other parties for assistance in 
the response of an oil pollution incident (Ibid: art. 8.1). This assistance may be given in terms 
of advisory services, technical support, equipment or personnel (Ibid: art. 8.3). The requesting 
party shall specify the type and the extent the assistance needed (Ibid: art. 8.2). It shall be 
facilitated for movement of response equipment and personnel into, through and out of the 
parties’ territories (Ibid: art. 9). Article 10 handles the economic issues with OSR assistance 
(Ibid). Overall it is the requesting party or the one who takes initiative that shall bear the 
costs. Article 11 demands a joint review after a response which is to be made publically 
available (Ibid). The parties shall work for cooperation and exchange of information, and 
strive to make the information available for the public (Ibid: art. 12). Joint exercises shall be 
carried out to promote cooperation and coordination (Ibid: art. 13). And they should 
incorporate learning from earlier exercises and response operations, and include stakeholders 
(Ibid). 
Specifications for operational guidelines, that shall be maintained and developed by the 
parties, are provided in article 21 (Ibid). The Operational Guidelines are presented in the 
appendices of the agreement and are not legally binding. There are six demands for what the 
operational guidelines shall address; first, a system and design for notification, request for 
assistance, and related information; second, provisions of assistance, as well as coordination 
and cooperation in response operations involving more than one party, including in areas 
beyond the jurisdiction of any state; third, movement and removal of resources across 
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borders; fourth, procedures for performing joint reviews of OSR operations; fifth, procedures 
for execution of joint exercises and training; and finally compensation of costs linked to 
assistance (Ibid). 
4.3 Administrational Section 
The last ten articles in the Agreement are more or less concerned about the concrete 
preservation of the Agreement. First, the parties shall meet no longer than one year after the 
agreement enters into force to discuss issues related to the implementation; then, on a regular 
basis through their competent national authorities to review and discuss the agreement (Ibid: 
art. 14). Further, it is settled issues on; resources (Ibid: art. 15); relation to other agreements 
(Ibid: art. 16); cooperation with non-parties (Ibid: art. 17); the appendices of the Agreement 
(Ibid: art. 20); provisional application of the Agreement, entry into force and withdraw (Ibid: 
art. 22); and depository (Ibid: art. 23). Disputes are to be resolved through direct consultations 
(Ibid: art. 18), and the Agreement may be revised by written agreement from all of the parties 
(Ibid: art. 19).  
4.4 Analysis 
Now as the structure of the Agreement is drawn, it is possible to analyze what principles, 
norms, rules and decision making procedures it establishes for the OSR system in the Arctic. 
As defined in the chapter on theoretical framework an international regimes is understood as” 
[…] sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” 
(Krasner, 1983: 2). Stephen Krasner’s definition implies that regimes have both a substantive 
and operative component (Sydnes & Sydnes, 2013: 258). The substantive component consist 
of principles, since they are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude; and norms, being 
standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations (Krasner, 1983:2, Sydnes & 
Sydnes, 2013: 258). The operative components are rules, which are specific instructions or 
prohibitions for action, and decision making procedures which Krasner (1983:2) sees as 
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. It is suitable to structure 
this analysis in two parts, one for the substantive components and one with operative 
components, to answer the last part of the research question […] which principles, norms, 




4.4.1 Substantive Components 
Principles 
The first of the principles are the objective of the Agreement, this is evidently a question of 
the regimes rectitude. It defines why the regime is important and strengthens the signatories’ 
belief of doing something righteous by implementing it. The belief is that by establishing the 
regime the marine environment will be better protected from oil pollution than before (AC, 
2013a: art. 1). Furthermore the regime has points of rectitude connected to its dedication to 
transparency as it strives to make after-response-reviews and other information publically 
available (Ibid: art. 11) and includes stakeholders in exercises (Ibid: art. 13).  
More principles are found in the definition article (Ibid: art. 2). It is beliefs of facts which the 
parties have agreed upon when they defines what the terms “oil”, “oil pollution incident”, and 
“ship” is understood as in the Agreement. 
Norms 
The text of the Agreement has, at first sight, more rules than norms since it in a greater extent 
demands action rather than sets standards for behavior. However, there are some article were 
norms are noticeable. As the Agreement is legally binding it definitely sets rules for action, 
while norms may be more prominent in the Operational Guidelines since the parties are not 
bound to obey them in the same way (Ibid: art. 21).  A party still expects other parties to 
behave as the Operational Guidelines proclaim, and the rights and obligations that is a part of 
the regime are defined more precise in the OGs than in the Agreement. In the Agreement it is 
located two issues where norms could be evident, when article 5 points to the responsibility 
for the contact points, and in article 8.1 where the parties’ right to request assistance is 
announced (Ibid). This is examples of two types of norms; obligation and right; they both say 
something about what is expected behavior under the regime. The main responsibility for the 
contact points is to receive and transmit oil pollution reports (Ibid: art. 5), this is an obligation 
for standard behavior for the personnel operation the contact points, while article 8.1 declare 
the right of the parties to request assistance when it is needed to conduct an OSR (Ibid). 
Further, article 8.3 expresses what type of assistance it is expected to get; advisory services, 




4.4.2 Operative Components 
Rules 
The Agreement is largely made up of rules since it is a legally binding document. These rules 
are all prescriptions for action, and not proscriptions. The findings points to the presence of 
rules in all of the articles in the operational section, in addition to one in the framework 
section. The articles in the administrative section include rules as well, but since these are 
rules about how decision making procedures are to be conducted they are discussed on the 
next paragraph. In the framework section the third article sets specific rules for the 
geographical scope (Ibid). This defines the area where the Agreement applies and the actions 
of the parties are required in case of an oil spill incident. In the operational section it is called 
for action within a variety of issues. The demand for establishment of national systems for 
OSR and preparedness in article 4 should be seen as an important element for the 
implementation capacity of the regime (Ibid). The Agreement is not ratified by a state before 
this is implemented (Ibid: art. 22) and the OSR regime in the Arctic, as a whole, is based on 
the national systems in each state working together. Article 5 demands the creation of one or 
more national contact points, which are to be established through the national systems (Ibid). 
In article 6 the Agreement touches the subject on how the response system shall work in order 
to handle a notification of oil pollution or possible oil pollution (Ibid). The rules are clear on 
this specific issue; the party shall find out whether it is an oil spill or not, asses the possible 
sources of the spill, it’s extent, the possible consequences, and what type of nature it is in the 
affected and nearby area (Ibid: art. 6.1a,b). Further, it is going to inform all states of severe 
incidents, and the states whose interest may be affected in smaller cases, in addition to giving 
continues updates until the response are done or collective action has been launched (Ibid: art. 
6.2). There is a rule for monitoring the area for new incidents and observing existing spills 
(Ibid: art. 7). When requesting assistance it is provided rules for how the request are specified 
concerning type and extent of the necessary assistance, and it shall be facilitated for the 
movement of material and personnel in the affected area (Ibid: art. 8.2, 9). Further, it is rules 
for the handling of economic cost of assistance in article 10, and article 11 sets the demand 
for joint reviews after a response operation (Ibid). In connection to the rule in article 12 it is 
rather hard to judge violations since it is about working for cooperation and exchange of 
information, but the article is never the less including a rule (Ibid). The last one, of the rules, 
stresses the execution of joint exercises (Ibid: art. 13). 
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These are all examples of rules that require action of the states. Rules differ from the norms 
since it is not just expected action; it is demanded (Krasner, 1982: 2). If one state chose not to 
follow the rules they are violating the Agreement. The distinction between rules and 
procedures are more unclear if we see how rules have the purpose to establish different 
procedures. The rule for conduction of joint exercises is an example where a rule seeks to 
establish procedures. These are, however, not included in the text of the Agreement, but will 
come about and develop as the cooperation is operationalized. 
Decision making procedures 
 In the administrational section of the Agreement, article 14-23, it is outlined issues related to 
the decision making procedures. Article 14 is about the meeting of the parties and states that 
they shall meet no longer than a year after the Agreement enters into force to discuss issues 
connected to the implementation of the regime (Ibid). After this the parties are to meet on a 
regular basis through their competent national authorities (Ibid). Potential disputes with 
regard to the Agreement are to be resolved through direct consultations (Ibid: art. 18). If the 
parties will make changes to the Agreement this may be done if all the parties agree in writing 
to the depositary (Ibid: art. 19).  These three articles explain the prevailing practices for 
creating collective choice within the regime. I addition, the developing and maintaining of the 
Operational Guidelines exemplifies how mutual decisions are being created and implemented 
(Ibid: art. 21). 
4.5 Summary 
The theoretical discussion of international regimes presented in the theory chapter pointed to 
some interesting views on regimes and their interest-based purpose in international relations. 
This study is not an evaluation of the impact this regime has on states behavior in the 
international system. Still it is clear that some of the elements presented will change, modify, 
or improve the OSR system in the Arctic region as the demands for national OSR systems are 
being implemented in the Arctic states. Through the analysis it has been identified most rules 
in addition to several principles, norms and decision making procedures for the Arctic oil spill 
response regime. Although, it is acknowledged that this is just the legal framework, while a 
vital part of the regime are developed through the operative work on OSR. 
Another advantage of the creation of this regime is the creation of an all-inclusive framework 
for OSR in the Arctic; it gathers all the different systems under one regime. While the 
bilateral, multilateral and national systems still are the primary solution for OSR response, the 
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Agreement of the Arctic states gives a frame for responding to incidents beyond jurisdiction 
of any state, and it provides requirements for developing the regional and national systems.  
In the next chapter it is done a review of the bilateral and regional OSR agreements in the 
Arctic, and it is found that these agreements largely follow the same structure as the one 
outlined here. This suggests that the Agreement’s structure is not controversial. It follows a 
pattern of how OSR agreements have been shaped in the Arctic for several decades. The 
content of the Operational Guidelines and the bilateral contingency plans are also reviewed in 
the next chapter, and issues related to political and professional influence on the regime 




5. Response System 
This chapter deals with the research question on response system; to what extent are the 
agreements under the Arctic OSR regime compatible? The Arctic OSR Agreement is 
gathering all the existing agreements on oil spill response under one umbrella. Analytically 
the arrangements are studied separately, but they constitute one system of response. Starting 
off with an review of the empirical findings on response system in the Arctic based on the text 
of the Agreement and its appendices, in addition to four of the pre-existing OSR agreements
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between two or more of the Arctic states, and five contingency plans (JCP) between the 
United States and Canada; Norway and the Russian Federation; the United States and the 
Russian Federation; and two between Canada and Denmark. An overview of the pre-existing 
agreements is provided in table 2
15
. The Arctic states’ Agreement and its Operational 
Guidelines are outlined first, followed by the pre-existing agreements and contingency plans, 
and finally, these findings are discussed in connection with the two models on response 
systems described in the theory; the command and control model and the problem solving 
model. Eleven variables are used to evaluate to what extent the different agreements and 
contingency plans are compatible. The findings are presented in table 3. 
 
Figure 5: The oil spill response system in the Arctic region. 
                                                 
14
 It is a total of six pre-existing bilateral or multilateral OSR agreements among Arctic states; this study is 
however only based on four. This is because; the Helsinki Convention has a wider range and includes so much 
more than oil spill incidents; and the agreement between Russian and Finland is only available in Russian or 
Finnish. Both of the excluded agreements are covering the Baltic Sea. 
15
 A list of all documents used in the document study is provided in appendix 1. 
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Table 2: Pre-existing bilateral and multilateral OSR agreements and contingency plans 
Title Signatories Date 
Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of 
Norway and the Government of the Russian Federation on 
cooperation to combat oil-spills in the Barents Sea 
 
Joint Norwegian-Russian Contingency Plan for the 
Combatment of Oil Pollution in the Barents Sea 





Agreement between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Denmark for Cooperation 
Relating to the Marine Environment 
 
Joint Contingency Plan concerning Pollution Incidents 
Resulting from Offshore Hydrocarbon Exploration or 
Exploitation 
 
Joint Contingency Plan concerning Pollution Incidents 
Resulting from Shipping Activities 
Canada, Denmark 1983 




Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States 
of America concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution 
in the Bering and Chukchi Seas in emergency situations 
 
United States of America and Russian Federation joint 
contingency plan against pollution in the Bering and Chukchi 
Seas 








Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden about Cooperation concerning Pollution Control of 
the Sea after Contamination by Oil or other Harmful 








Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the Government of the Republic of 
Finland on Co-operation in Combating Pollution of the Baltic 
Sea in accidents involving oil and other harmful substances 
(not analyzed in this study) 
Russia, Finland 1989 
Helsinki Convention – Convention on the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area 









                                                 
16
 Originally from 1983, revision from 2003 
17
 Originally from 1993, revision from 1998 
18
 Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the EEC 
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5.1 Arctic States’ Oil Spill Response Agreement 
In the previous chapter the OSR Agreement of the Arctic states was investigated, and it was 
found that the operational section of the Agreement handles response in a number of articles. 
It is not considered necessary to repeat this empirical material for the analysis in this chapter. 
Instead the relevant articles are summarized and it is taken a closer look at the Operational 
Guidelines. 
5.1.1 The Agreement 
The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the 
Arctic (AC, 2013a) points out the demand and requirements for national OSR systems (art. 4), 
and to the “competent national authority” and 24-hour operational contact points (Ibid: art. 5). 
Notification and monitoring are dealt with (Ibid: art. 6-7), and procedures for requesting 
assistance (Ibid: art. 8). Facilitation for movement of resources across borders is dealt with in 
art. 9. It is demanded that it will be performed a joint review after a response operation (Ibid: 
art. 11). Exchange of information shall be conducted in the cooperation, in addition they shall 
work to make the information publically (Ibid: art. 12). To promote cooperation and 
coordination it will be executed joint exercises (Ibid: art. 13). A typical response process, 
which shows some of these elements, is illustrated in figure 6. The figure illustrates elements 
that are not as clear when just looking at the text in the Agreement, the Operational 
Guidelines are therefore an important part of the empirical material to understand the OSR 
regime which is being established in the Arctic.  
5.1.2 Operational Guidelines 
The Operational Guidelines are more detailed in their description of the response system than 
the Agreement itself and more of the elements in figure 6 are described in the OGs; 
notification, assistance, and post incident review. Additionally, it is described procedures for 
joint training and response, and relocation of material and personnel during oil spill response. 
It is recommended, in the Operational Guidelines, to use standard forms for notification and 
assistance to provide identical means for informing other parties of details of the incident 
(Ibid: 14). A joint review of OSR operations has the purpose to draw experience from the 
operational parts of the response, from notification and termination, to identify and evaluate 
areas for improvement to make necessary changes in the OGs (Ibid, 24). Joint exercises and 
training may be conducted to promote cooperation and coordination among the parties (Ibid: 
25). All parties should also facilitate for movement of equipment, products and response 
38 
 
personnel through their territory in response operations, including efficient processing or 





















Figure 6: Flow diagram of typical incident scenario with draft application of agreement 
elements (Trigatti, 2013). 
Although the bilateral and multilateral agreements, and the contingency plans, provide a 
framework for the response to oil pollution incidents in some areas of the Arctic, it is 
acknowledged that some areas are not covered by the pre-existing arrangements. Therefore, 
some general principles have been provided in the OGs (AC, 2013a: 21-23). 
The requesting party (RP) has operational command and control of all OSR operations (Ibid). 
It is the RP’s responsibility to fully integrate the assisting party’s vessels, aircraft, equipment, 
products, personnel and communication systems into the RP’s command and control system, 
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while the assisting party also has to integrate their capacities into the system of the RP (Ibid). 
Should it become necessary to transfer the command to another party this will be negotiated 
among the competent national authorities with regard to the overall picture and any possible 
development trends (Ibid). The competent national authorities have the responsibility for oil 
pollution preparedness and response, and are to a large extent embodied by ministries and 
national coast guards (Ibid: 1). When an incident of oil pollution occurs in areas where none 
of the pre-existing bilateral or multilateral agreements apply, or in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction
19
, those parties whose interests may be threatened may volunteer to respond (Ibid: 
23). In such cases the volunteer party’s command and control system will in general be used 
(Ibid: 21). If no party volunteers, the competent national authorities shall assess magnitude, 
spread, movement, risk to marine living resources or sensitive ecosystem, responder safety, 
and other factors deemed important (Ibid). Large OSR operations demands a close 
cooperation between the RP and the assisting parties, and any of the parties may therefore 
request to designate liaison officers to facilitate information flow, communicate options and 
wishes, and support direct communication between the parties (Ibid: 23). 
The Operational Guidelines recognizes that command and control systems are already in 
place in each of the states, so the Agreement does not seek to create a general system for this 
(AC, 2013a: 22). It is also acknowledged that the pre-existing bilateral and multilateral 
agreements on OSR between Arctic states establishes systems for joint response, and have 
defined arrangements for command and control (Ibid). 
5.2 Bilateral and Multilateral OSR Agreements and Contingency Plans 
The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Prevention Preparedness and 
Response is built on the existing agreements between two or more of the Arctic states, and 
recognizes that these will guide the coordination in response operations within their 
jurisdiction (AC, 2013a: 11). The Operational Guidelines (OGs) are suggested to aid the 
revision of the existing plans, and could be used in addition to the bilateral and multilateral 
agreements (Ibid). 
5.2.1 The OSR Agreement of the Barents Sea (Norway – Russia) 
The Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of 
the Russian Federation on cooperation to combat oil-spills in the Barents Sea (1994) has 
sixteen articles in total, and eight of these are found to be interesting for the analysis. It is 
                                                 
19
 i.e. on the high seas 
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emphasized on the importance of development of a joint contingency plan, notification and 
exchange of information, use of competent national authorities, assistance, joint exercises, and 
effective relocation of resources. 
Regardless of where such contamination may occur, Russia and Norway shall assist each 
other in combat of oil pollution that may affect the areas covered by this agreement (Ibid, art. 
1). To get this achieved the competent authorities shall develop a joint contingency plan for 
combating oil pollution in the Barents Sea (Ibid). The contingency plan may be applied when 
an oil pollution incident affects or threatens to affect both parties’ area of responsibility, or if 
the incident affects one of the parties' area and the incident is of such magnitude that it 
justifies a request for the other party assistance (Ibid: art. 8). The joint OSR required by the 
contingency plan can only be performed when the competent national authorities agree to it, 
and they will decide what action is required in every case of oil pollution (Ibid: art. 9). In case 
of oil pollution potentially affecting the other country’s area of responsibility the competent 
authority, which discovered the pollution, shall immediately notify the other party's 
competent authority (Ibid: art. 4). Such notification shall be in accordance with the procedures 
set forth in the contingency plan (Ibid). The competent authority of the party who has an 
incident of oil pollution within its area of responsibility shall lead OSR operation within this 
area (Ibid: art. 7).The parties shall regularly exchange information and consult each other to 
ensure appropriate cooperation between their competent authorities in areas covered by this 
agreement and the contingency plan (Ibid: art. 5). It shall regularly be conducted joint oil 
pollution exercises and be held meetings in accordance with the contingency plan (Ibid: art. 
12). The responsibility for organizing exercises shall rotate among the competent authorities 
of the two countries (Ibid). The requesting party shall, as far as possible, facilitate the arrival 
and return of response resources provided by the assisting party (Ibid: art. 13). 
5.2.2 The Joint Norwegian – Russian Contingency Plan 
As article 1 in the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on cooperation to combat oil-spills in the Barents Sea 
(1994) demands the Parties have developed the Joint Norwegian-Russian Contingency Plan 
for the Combatment of Oil Pollution in the Barents Sea (2009). The contingency plan is meant 
to support relevant national, regional and local contingency plans (Ibid: 4).  
In case of a response situation in the Barents Sea the national authority in Norway and Russia 
will strive to make any resources they may have available for the use in a joint OSR operation 
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(Ibid: 6).The joint OSR operation should include two levels of coordination and command; 
operational control on shore and tactical command on the scene of the operation, led by the 
supreme on-scene commander (Ibid: 7). Unless otherwise agreed, it is the competent national 
authority of the country requesting assistance that shall lead the joint response (Ibid: 8). 
Liaison officers should be integrated in the operational control to ensure information of the 
participating countries’ resources (Ibid: 5). National on-scene commanders (NOSC) shall lead 
oil combating strike teams from each country (Ibid). These teams will normally be given 
different tasks in defined geographical areas (Ibid: 8). When it is found appropriate, units 
from different strike teams may be put at the disposal of the other country’s NOSC (Ibid: 9). 









Figure 7: General principles for the OSR system in the Barents Sea (Ibid: 7). 
The command of the OSR operation will in general be transferred to the other country if the 
larger part of the pollution is crossing the border (Ibid: 8). Timing of the transfer are to be 
negotiated due to the overall picture and possible development (Ibid). It is the responsibility 
of the joint planning group to plan and prepare for response operations (Ibid: 10). This 
includes developing procedures for coordinated response by all the involved agencies, 
reviewing post-incident reports for the purpose to analyze response actions and make 
recommendations for improvements, and forward the information to appropriate federal, state 
and regional authorities (Ibid). The continued viability of the contingency plan is dependent 
















is to be maintained by arranging one exercise and one meeting of the joint planning group 
each year, evaluation of joint operation when required, and the exchange of a report of the 
most current information in relation to a pollution incident with description of actions taken 
and progress made during the response annually (Ibid: 5, 10). During an OSR it will, further, 
be established a joint response center where facilities are available to provide requirements to 
accomplish the provisions of the contingency plan (Ibid: 13). 
5.2.3 OSR in the Bering and Chukchi Seas (US – Russia) 
This agreement, between the United States and the Russian Federation, which was signed at 
the very end of the Cold War in May 1989 includes fifteen articles and seven of these are 
found relevant for this study. The Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America concerning 
Cooperation in Combating Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas in emergency situations 
(1989) has fifteen articles all together. A review of the articles with implications for response 
system is following. 
The United States and the Russian Federation agrees to provide assistance to each other in 
combatting pollution incidents that may affect the areas of responsibility of the parties, 
regardless of where such incidents may occur (Ibid: art. 1). This assistance shall be given 
consistent with the provisions of this agreement (Ibid). The competent authorities of the 
parties shall develop the Joint Contingency Plan against Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi 
Seas which shall enter into force upon their written agreement (Ibid).They shall routinely 
exchange up-to-date information and consult to guarantee adequate cooperation between their 
competent authorities, with regard to activities pertaining to this agreement and the 
contingency plan (Ibid: art 4). The implementation of the contingency plan shall be the 
primary responsibility of the competent authorities of the countries, or other authorities to the 
extent of such other authorities’ competence under applicable law (Ibid: art. 5). The 
contingency plan may be edited by the competent authorities from time to time, consistent 
with this agreement and the procedures set forth in the contingency plan (Ibid). The 
competent authority of the party in whose area of responsibility the pollution incident occurs, 
or whose area of responsibility is affected by such an incident, shall lead the OSR operations 
within that area (Ibid: art. 6). The contingency plan may be invoked whenever a pollution 
incident occurs that affects or threatens to affect the areas of responsibility of both parties or 
the incident is of such a magnitude as to justify a request for the other party’s assistance (Ibid: 
art. 7). It will periodically be conducted joint pollution response exercises and meetings in 
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accordance with the provisions of the contingency plan (Ibid: art. 11). The competent 
authorities of the parties shall alternate in the supervision of the exercises (Ibid). The 
requesting party shall, to the greatest extent possible, facilitate the arrival and the departure of 
response resources made available by the assisting party for response activities (Ibid: art. 12). 
5.2.4 Joint Contingency Plan against Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas 
As the agreement between USA and Russia refers to in several articles; it is developed a 
contingency plan for this cooperation. The Joint Contingency Plan against Pollution in the 
Bering and Chukchi Seas (1997) was originally created with the agreement, but was updated 
in 1997 to change USSR to the Russian Federation and include the proper competent national 
authorities after the fall of the Soviet Union (Ibid: 17). 
The contingency plan is based in three aspects: planning, coordination of joint response and 
communications (Ibid: 6). Competent authorities of the parties are committed to cooperate 
when oil pollution incidents affects or threatens both parties (Ibid). Competent agencies will 
make any resources they may have available for the joint OSR operation (Ibid). The joint 
response team (JRT) will be activated in the event of a pollution incident, and shall provide 
guidance to the on-scene commander and coordinate the response, in addition to planning and 
preparing before a response action (Ibid: 6-8). It is the JRT who determines change of on-
scene commander from one party to the other if this is appropriate (Ibid: 8).  A Co-Chair to 
the JRT form the U.S. will be designated by the Commander Seventeenth Coast Guard district 
and will lead the response operation when it occurs in U.S. area of responsibility (Ibid: 7). 
From the Russian Federation the Co-Chair will be designated by the General Director of the 
Far Eastern Salvage Department, Marine Pollution Control and Salvage Administration and 
will lead the operation when the pollution occurs in the Russian area of responsibility (Ibid). 
If the plan is invoked due to an incident outside of the areas of responsibility the Co-Chairs 
will determine who will chair the JRT (Ibid). The first official to arrive at the pollution scene 
will coordinate the activities until it is designated an on-scene commander (Ibid: 9). The party 
who are not providing the on-scene commander are to designate a deputy on-scene 
commander to work as a liaison officer (Ibid: 10). Members of the JRT shall consist of 
representatives from competent agencies appropriate to national and regional contingency 
plans (Ibid: 7). Exercises shall be conducted once every two years and meetings of the JRT 
shall be held at least once every 18 months (Ibid: 9). It is recognized that the continued 
viability of the plan is dependent on the development of working relationships among the 
competent agency members through periodic exercises and meetings (Ibid). Joint response 
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centers will be established to provide facilities for the fulfillment of the plan’s provisions 
(Ibid: 12). Up-to-date information during an OSR are to be provided to the JRT through 
US/RF SITREPS (situational reports) to ensure that those who need the information have 
access to the latest developments, actions taken, and progress made during the response (Ibid: 
14). The JRT may request the on-scene commander and the deputy to submit reports and 
conduct debriefings after the response (Ibid: 15). 
5.2.5 The OSR Agreement between Canada and Denmark 
The Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Kingdom of 
Denmark for Cooperation Relating to the Marine Environment (1983) has fourteen articles, 
where the following four articles are found relevant for this study. 
Before starting any activity in its area of responsibility, which may create a significant risk of 
pollution in the area of responsibility of the other party, each party shall provide the other 
party with all relevant information (Ibid: art. 4.1). If a party requests consultation on such 
activities this shall be done (Ibid: art. 4.2). Such consultations, “held in the best spirit of 
cooperation and good neighborliness”, shall not be used by a party to delay the activities 
(Ibid). The Parties shall cooperate for the purpose of promoting studies, undertaking programs 
of scientific research and encouraging the exchange of information and data acquired relating 
to pollution of the marine environment (Ibid: art. 6.1). In particular the parties shall cooperate 
in; complementary or joint scientific research programs for observation of the marine 
environment; development of compatible marine pollution measurement methods; and 
development of methods to assess the risk and extent of damage related to any introduction of 
harmful substances into the marine environment (Ibid). At the request of a party, and when 
appropriate, the other party shall provide information on existing or proposed legislative, 
regulatory or other governmental control measures that may affect the marine environment in 
the other’s area of responsibility (Ibid: art. 6.2). The parties shall hold consultations on any 
subject covered by this article when requested of either party or at reasonable intervals agreed 
upon (Ibid: art. 6.3). They agree on cooperation and assistance in vessel traffic management in 
the area covered by the agreement (Ibid: art. 7.1). This includes identification, monitoring and 
review of routs for vessels in the area outside territorial waters, for the purpose of avoiding 
damaging effects to the marine environment and to the economic and social conditions in the 
area (Ibid: art: 7.2.1).  
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The parties shall facilitate entry into its area of responsibility of vessels, aircraft, personnel or 
equipment of the other party taking part in response operations referred to in the annexes to 
the agreement (Ibid: art. 9). Although the agreement does not specify a demand for joint 
contingency planning it is referred to joint response in article 9, and the appendices provides 
two relevant contingency plans between Canada and Denmark; one on oil spill incidents 
resulting from offshore hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation, and one on issues related to 
shipping. 
5.2.6 Contingency Plans between Canada and Denmark 
The first of the contingency plans are the Joint Contingency Plan concerning Pollution 
Incidents Resulting from Offshore Hydrocarbon Exploration or Exploitation (1983). 
When a pollution incident occurs, the party who discovered it shall respond rapidly and call 
for assistance from the other party (Ibid: §1.4). Information is to be exchanged on drilling 
operations and related matters, when plans are developed, during drilling operations, and 
when the drilling is completed (Ibid: §2). It shall be exchanged information on the status and 
implementation of their pollution contingency plans, including contingency plans for the 
operators in the area (Ibid: § 2.2). Additionally, they shall keep each other informed of; the 
agencies responsible for coordinating response operations; the organizations and officials 
responsible within the agencies; the procedures to initiate the contingency plans for the area; 
personnel, equipment and other resources that may be available (Ibid: §2.4). When a pollution 
incident occurs, that affects or threatens to affect the areas of responsibility of both parties, the 
party in whose area the pollution incident has occurred shall immediately notify the other 
party (Ibid: § 3.1). The parties shall keep each other informed of developments, and of any 
action they may take or plan to take in order to combat the pollution incident (Ibid: § 3.2). It 
shall be facilitated for a representative of the other party to observe the planning, evaluation 
and implementation of response operations to combat the pollution incident, if this is 
requested (Ibid: § 4.1). The party in whose area the pollution incident occurs shall supervise 
and command the response operations within this area by designating an On-Scene 
Commander (OSC), who for this purpose are not required to be located in the geographical 
position of the incident (Ibid: §5.1). During joint response operations shall an OSC be assisted 
by a Deputy On-Scene Commander (DOSC) appointed by the Party that is not providing the 
OSC (Ibid: §5.2). The DOSC shall act as the direct liaison between the OSC and the agencies 
of the assisting party (Ibid). If the incident shifts into the other party’s area it shall be 
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determined whether and when a shift of supervision and command shall happen and the 
DOSC shall prepare arrangements for such shift (Ibid: §5.3). 
The second contingency plan between Canada and Denmark are dealing with shipping in the 
area. It is called the Joint Contingency Plan concerning Pollution Incidents Resulting from 
Shipping Activities (1983). 
For the purpose of increasing the safety of shipping and to protect the marine environment, 
the parties shall strive to exchange current information on the nature and movement of 
shipping in the area, and of the parties contingency plans for these issues (Ibid: §1.1, 1.2). The 
information shall include; agencies responsible for coordinating response operations in the 
event of a ship-source pollution incident; organizations and officials responsible within the 
agencies; the procedures to initiate the contingency plans for the areas; and personnel, 
equipment and other resources that may be available (Ibid: §1.4). In the event of a pollution 
incident, the party within whose area of responsibility the incident occurs shall make an 
assessment of the environment and decide whether to initiate a response operation (Ibid: 
§3.1). If a pollution incident occurs, that may affects the areas of both parties, the party in 
whose area of responsibility the pollution incident has occurred shall immediately notify the 
other party in order to enable them to decide whether to initiate a response operation (Ibid: 
§4.1). The parties shall keep each other fully informed of developments relating to the 
pollution incident, and of any action they may take or plan to take in order to combat the 
pollution incident (Ibid: §4.2). When a pollution incident occurs, each party shall respond 
rapidly and to the best of its ability call for assistance from the other party (Ibid: §5.1). It shall 
be facilitated for representatives of the other party to observe the planning, evaluation and 
implementation of the response operation (Ibid: §6.1). Response operations to combat a 
pollution incident shall be supervised by the party initiating the response and they shall 
designate an On-Scene Commander (OSC), who for this purpose are not required to be 
located in the geographical position of the incident (Ibid: §7.1). During a joint effort the 
assisting party may appoint a Deputy On-Scene Commander (Ibid: 7.2). A shift of supervision 
and command of joint operations from one party to the other may be determined by the parties 
in light of the development of the response operation (Ibid: §7.3). 
5.2.7 The Copenhagen Agreement 
The Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden about Cooperation 
Concerning Pollution Control of the Sea after Contamination by Oil or other Harmful 
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Substances (1998) is the only multilateral agreement, of the pre-existing, taken into account in 
this study. It is signed by the five Nordic Countries
20
 in 1993 and updated in 1998. This 
cooperation is also the only one of the agreements in this study that does not have any 
contingency plans attached, which may be a result of the fact that the contingency plans may 
be easier to maintain at bilateral level. The agreement is made up of eighteen articles where 
six are outlined here because of their relevance to the study. 
The parties are responsible for the implementation of an appropriate monitoring in their 
respective waters and will enter into agreements for joint monitoring or coordination of 
monitoring (Ibid: art. 3). A party who discovers an oil pollution of significant extent in the 
marine environment shall as soon as possible inform the other parties thereof and of the 
measures implemented or planned to be implemented (Ibid: art. 5.1). If it is discovered 
violation of the regulation to prevent contamination of the sea in the other party's sea area, the 
party who discovers this shall inform the other party (Ibid: art. 5.2). Any party, who require 
assistance in its sea area, may request the other parties for such help (Ibid: art. 8.1). The party 
who has received requests for such assistance shall do what is possible to provide the help 
needed (Ibid). Authorities with responsibility for combating pollution of the sea may request 
the other parties’ agencies for help directly, the agency will then determine whether such 
assistance can be provided (Ibid: art. 8. 2). It is the authorities of the requesting party that has 
full responsibility for the management of the OSR operation within its maritime zone (Ibid: 
art. 8.3). Personnel from the assisting party shall be at disposal under this management, and 
perform their service in the territory of the requesting party in accordance to the rules 
applicable in their homeland (Ibid). The requesting party is responsible for ensuring that 
vehicles, rescue equipment and other equipment that are included in the OSR operation may 
be transported across the border without import and export formalities, and without the 
imposition of taxes (Ibid: art. 9.1). Vehicles, rescue equipment and other equipment shall be 
used in accordance with the applicable rules of the assisting party and without the need for 
getting special permission for the use of it (Ibid). After the response or exercise is completed, 
the material shall be removed from the country as soon as possible (Ibid). The other parties 
shall at the request of the help seeking or the assisting party take appropriate measures to 
facilitate transit through its own territory to and from the help seeking territory of notified 
personnel, vehicles, rescue equipment and other equipment in connection with the assistance 
(Ibid: art. 9.3). The parties shall inform each other about; its organization and its contingency 
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 I.e. Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Finland 
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plans, as well as the responsible authorities for combating pollution of the sea, and 
monitoring; any experiences in the use of means and methods of combating pollution and the 
results of the monitoring activities; and technical research and development (Ibid: art. 12). To 
implement the agreement they shall develop cooperation in the work area through the 
development of plans and policies as well as carrying out exercises (Ibid: art. 13.1). It is 
expected that the parties’ competent authorities are in direct contact with each other when 
implementing the agreement (Ibid: art. 13.2). This may also be relevant at the regional and 
local level in accordance with plans and guidelines prepared by the parties (Ibid). 
5.2.8 Canada – US Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan  
This plan is the only one in the material that is outlined separately, without a link to an 
agreement. The decision to develop this contingency plan was grounded in the signing of the 
1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement and the following Canada – United States Joint 
Marine Pollution Contingency Plan for the Great Lakes from 1974. In 1983 the contiguous 
zone was added to the contingency plan. The material here is gathered form the 2003 revision 
of Canada – United States Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan. 
The joint contingency plan is meant to supplement the national response systems for the areas 
by providing a bridge between the two systems, and to ensures cooperative and coordinated 
bilateral response planning at the national and local level (Ibid: 5, 7). Consultations between 
the parties on response issues shall be performed (Ibid: 5). It is the coast guard in each of the 
countries that are responsible for coordinating and overseeing issues of operational readiness 
in their areas of responsibility among other federal, state, provincial and local agencies (Ibid: 
7). An on-scene commander from the Canadian Coast Guard and an on-scene coordinator 
from the U.S. Coast Guard are tasked to ensure a timely and appropriate response (Ibid). The 
system is based on plans for different areas which is presented in the geographical annexes of 
the plan (Ibid: 8). These provide plans for a joint exercise program based on the current 
available resources and risk analysis (Ibid: 8). It shall be carried out at least one table-top 
exercise, or a more resource demanding exercise, every two years (Ibid). The importance of 
lessons learned after a response or exercise are highlighted (Ibid: 9). Advisory teams with 
personnel from both nations’ agencies, called joint response teams, will counsel to facilitate 
coordinated planning, preparedness and response to an incident, and prepare debriefing 
reports and make recommendations for changes to the contingency plan (Ibid: 4, 9). The joint 
response team will also support the on-scene commander and the on-scene coordinator (Ibid: 
10). The parties shall inform each other on incidents in their respective waters, and the on-
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scene commander or coordinator will inform the other party about the response (Ibid). Joint 
response may be activated by verbal agreement between the on-scene commander and the on-
scene coordinator followed by a written confirmation (Ibid). The parties will, to the greatest 
extent possible, facilitate the movement of resources across boundaries (Ibid: 11, 13). It is 
acknowledged that response operations require close cooperation between the Canadian on-
scene commander and the American on-scene coordinator to manage both countries private 
and public sectors (Ibid). A liaison officer from the other party is appointed to facilitate the 
information flow and support direct communication if one of the parties requires it (Ibid: 11). 
The parties will jointly inform the media and the public (Ibid: 13). Within 180 days after the 
incident the on-scene commander and coordinator are to prepare a joint post incident report 
(Ibid: 14). 
5.3 Findings 
Table 3 illustrates the findings in the material. Eleven variables were used to evaluate to what 
extent the different agreements and contingency plans are compatible. In addition to the 
variables in the table it is worth mentioning the Agreement’s (art. 11) demand for joint post-
incident review, which is not found in more than two of the pre-existing documents: the US-
Russian JCP and the US-Canadian JCP. The authority structures of the different arrangements 







When reviewing the findings in table 3 we find several elements that are corresponding 
among the oil spill response. By including the Operational Guidelines as well as the pre-
existing arrangements a picture of the OSR system in the Arctic is formed. The different 
agreements and contingency plans are quite similar in contents. This makes it easier to tie this 
together to better understand the OSR system in the region, and evaluate to what extent the 
agreements under the Arctic OSR regime are compatible. This analysis uses the command 
and control model as a counter to the problem solving model. In the theory chapter these two 
were described as the ‘military’ command and control model, and the more knowledge based 
problem solving model. The characteristics of the two models are used as variables to 
recognize the compatibleness in the empirical evidence presented. The eleven variables are: 
notification, exchange of information, assistance, competent national authorities, flexible 
authority structure, joint contingency plan, joint exercises, personal contact, liaison activities, 
effective relocation of resources, and shared facilities. 
All the bilateral agreements have joint contingency plans for more detailed descriptions of 
operative aspects in the cooperation. Canada-Denmark does not demand the development of a 
shared contingency plan, but have two attached in the appendices of the agreement. The 
multilateral agreements; among the Arctic states and the Copenhagen Agreement does not 
include contingency plans. The Copenhagen Agreement recommends the parties to develop 
the cooperation through plans and policies (art. 13.1), while the Agreement provides the states 
with operational guidelines to support revision and development at the national and bilateral 
level (AC, 2013a: 11).  
While the command and control model are assuming that agencies, during an emergency, will 
be traumatized and abandon by the personnel the problem solving model encourage to try to 
create a collective decision making process (Dynes, 1994: 148-150). The Joint Contingency 
Plan (JCP) of the Norwegian-Russian cooperation emphasizes on the responsibility of the 
joint planning group (Nor-Rus JCP, 2009: 10). The joint planning group will plan and prepare 
joint response operations (Ibid) and are thereby establishing procedures for a collective 
decision making between the two countries. Together they will develop procedures for 
coordinating all the involved agencies, use post-incident reports to analyze response actions 
and recommend improved procedures for the authorities (Ibid).  By highlighting the role of 
competent national authorities (AC, 2013a: art 5) the Agreement and the Operational 
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Guidelines sets a stand for the importance of continuity by using the same authorities during 
an oil spill response as in pre-emergency situations. Competent national authorities are 
mentioned in all agreements with one exception: Canada – Denmark. This cooperation does 
not seem to emphasize, to the same extent as the others, the importance of using an 
unchanged authority structure in an emergency situation. The structure for the response in the 
Canadian-Danish cooperation is more reliant on the responsibility of each state separately 
rather than developing a collective process. The party in whose area the pollution incident 
occurs shall supervise and command response operations within this area, assess the nature in 
the area, and decide whether to respond or not (Can-Den JCP Hydro, 1983: §5.1, Can-Den 
JCP ship, 1983: §3.1). An On-Scene Commander (OSC) who is leading the response is not 
even requested to be on sight which is a sign of centralization of command (Can-Den JCP 
Hydro, 1983: §5.1). During joint responses the OSC will be assisted by a Deputy On-Scene 
Commander from the other party (Ibid). This may suggest the formation of an artificial 
authority structure as the Command and Control model present as the solution to secure a 
successful response. The Norwegian-Russian, US-Russian and the US-Canadian systems uses 
the term On-Scene Commander too, but the structures are rather different. As shown in figure 
7, the Norwegian-Russian authority structure during a joint response operation is led by 
national authorities of the lead country, with support of the other party (Nor-Rus JCP, 2009: 
7). Each country is, nonetheless, in command of its own strike teams, which will be given 
different task during the response (Ibid). The US-Russian JCP calls for a Joint Response 
Team to be established in the event of an OSR (US-Rus JCP, 1989: 6-8). This is a collective 
decision making unit responsible for coordinating, planning and preparing the response and 
guiding the On-Scene Commander (Ibid). Similar to this structure are the US-Canadian 
advisory team, also called Joint Response Team (US-Can JCP 2003: 4, 9). This team consist 
of personnel from both nations agencies and have the same responsibilities as the US-Russian 
team (Ibid). The Copenhagen Agreement (1998) and the Operational Guidelines of the 
Agreement (AC, 2013a) puts the responsibility for the OSR on the competent national 
authorities of the party who requests assistance. If it becomes necessary to transfer command 
to another party, the Agreement recommends that the competent national authorities will be 
flexible with regard to the overall picture and possible development trends (AC, 2013a: 1). 
This is underlined in the Canadian-Danish and the Norwegian-Russian JCP as well (Can-Den 
§5.3; Can-Dan Ship: §7.3; Nor-Rus JCP, 2009: 8). Two other points could be signs of 
flexibility; the strike teams in the Norwegian-Russian structure may be put at disposal of the 
other party (Nor-Rus JCP, 2009: 9), and in the US-Russian JCP it is stated that the first 
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official to arrive at the scene will coordinate until it is designated an On-Scene Commander 
(US-Rus JCP, 1997: 9). As we can observe in table 3; it is emphasized on the importance of 
information exchange and notification in most of the documents. The only cooperation where 
notification is not noted is in the US-Russian. Exchange of information is found in all 
cooperation structures, either in the agreement or the plan, except in the US-Canadian. 
Overall this could be stressed as an important point of corresponding values. Joint exercises 
and liaison activity are important for the personal contact and building of relationships. This is 
a major concern in the operational guidelines (AC, 2013a: 23), and this notion is shared in the 
contingency plans of Norway-Russia (2009: 5), US-Canada (2003: 11), and US-Russia (1997: 
10). While exercises are not at all mentioned in the Canadian and Danish cooperation, the 
JCPs are concerned about liaison activities during response operations (Ship: §6.1; Hydro: 
§4.1). In the theory of the problem solving model, under the idea of cooperation, it is 
recommended to focus on effective ways to relocate human and material resources (Dynes, 
1994: 155). During joint response operations, as described in all of the agreements and JCP, 
the right to request assistance is fundamental. All the agreements are regulating request and 
provision of assistance. This includes facilitation of effective relocation of human and 
material resources, which is noted in all of the pre-existing agreements (Nor-Rus, 2009: art. 
13; US-Rus, 1989: art. 12; Can-Den, 1983: art. 9; Copenhagen, 1993: art 8.1;) in addition to 
the Agreement (AC, 2013a: art. 9), the Operational Guidelines (Ibid: 19) and four JCP (Nor-
Rus, 2003: 6; Can-Den, 1983 ship: §1.4; Can-US, 2003: 11, 13; US-Rus, 1997: 6). Shared 
facilities are the last of the variables included in this analysis. The problem solving model 
highlights that the establishment of shared facilities can further enhance coordination in oil 
spill response (Dynes, 1994: 150). The US-Russian and the Norwegian-Russian JCPs will 
both establish joint response centers in the case of a joint response operation (Nor-Rus, 2009: 
13; US-Rus, 1997: 12). The Copenhagen Agreement requests the parties to establish joint 
monitoring of the area (Copenhagen, 1998: art. 3). The Canadian-Danish agreement are 
concerned about cooperation within scientific research programs for observing the marine 
environment, developing methods for pollution measurements, and assessing risk connected 
to these issues (Can-Dan, 1983: art. 6.1). This is a subject were the other cooperation 
structures probably should take lessons from the agreement between Canada and Denmark. 
Although the situation in real life may include this sort of cooperation it is not evident when 




The research in this chapter has investigated the response system in the Arctic by looking at 
the Agreement on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic and the pre-
existing bilateral and multilateral cooperation structures. It was used eleven variables to 
analyze the question: to what extent are the agreements under the Arctic OSR regime 
compatible? It was found that the authority structures of the different agreements and 
contingency plans are designed quite similar. Most divergent was the structure of the 
Canadian-Danish cooperation where it was found a more centralized command and not as 
clear collective decision making unit as in the cooperation among the other states. The 
National Competent Authority has an important role in the Agreement, as well as in the 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Another important finding was the cooperation within 
scientific research, which is only emphasized on in the Canadian-Danish agreement. Effective 





6. The Role of Politics and Professions 
This chapter takes a closer look at the implications the institutional framework of the Arctic 
Council has for the political and professional influence in the formation of the OSR regime. 
The research question analyzed is; to what extent are the political and professional 
representatives influencing different stages in the formation of the Agreement? In addition to 
interview data it is used documents as a source of data. A list of the documents is provided in 
appendix 1. 
The Arctic Council was in the introduction presented as a political forum. Despite the political 
context, with foreign ministerial meetings as the main decision making arena, the review of 
the regime and the response system showed a significant presence of professionals in the 
organization. The agreements and contingency plans highlighted the importance of competent 
national authorities in the oil spill response regime in the Arctic. The focus here is, yet again, 
on the Arctic states’ OSR Agreement, and the Agreement is studied with the emphasis on 
political and professional influence in different stages of the regime formation. The attention 
is on; agenda setting, development and negotiation of the Agreement, and operationalization. 
The first part of the chapter outlines the empirical evidence organized after Young’s (1998) 
three stages of regime formation, the findings are then discussed, and at the end of the chapter 
the main findings are summarized. 
As mentioned in the introduction the text was developed and negotiated in the Task Force on 
Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response, while it was created in legal terms 
through the signing at the political level, and the ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council 
(AC, 2013a). Further, the development of the operational guidelines and organizing of 
exercises are done by the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response working group 
(EPPR) in consultation with competent national authorities (AC, 2013a: 25, [INF 1]). This 
creates a picture of the three stages of regime formation: agenda formation, negotiation and 
operationalization. 
6.1 Agenda Formation 
The Agreement was initiated in the Arctic Council, but it is the eight Arctic countries that 
have signed it, and entered into the cooperation outside of the Council itself [INF 5]. AC is 
not a forum for developing international law, but it is a circumpolar council of countries with 
the interest for filling the gaps in international law covering the Arctic Region [INF 4, 5]. The 
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members of the Arctic Council are interested in withstanding the power vacuum in the region, 
and making the AC function as a watchdog of the Arctic development [INF 4].  
Reports from meetings of the EPPR working group, shows the first sign of the regime 
formation in the report from the meeting in November 2010. Here it was conducted a 
discussion on a new project; the Arctic Response Cooperation MOU (EPPR, Nov. 2010: 12). 
EPPR were reviewing the agreements on response in the Arctic region and recognized the 
gaps in the framework through the Review of the revised Analysis of Agreements (Ibid: 4). An 
representative from the United States commented on this and brought up the proposal of a 
new agreement (Ibid: 5). The reason for the proposal was experience from the response in the 
Gulf of Mexico earlier the same year when an explosion on the offshore drilling rig 
Deepwater Horizon led to a massive oil spill (Ibid). “The agreements in place with foreign 
nations were inadequate to address Deepwater Horizon” (Ibid: 5). Issues were associated to 
customs, trade, and transportation, which were not covered by the existing agreements (Ibid). 
The U.S. Coast Guard proposed an agreement between the Arctic countries to address issues 
related to assistance in oil spill response (Ibid). The response on the Deepwater Horizon spill 
showed a lack of “clear and established systems for international assistance” [INF 4]. The 
proposal for an international agreement on OSR in the Arctic had been proposed several years 
earlier [INF 6]. However, it was the proof of absence of a sufficient operative cooperation that 
put the OSR on the agenda [INF 4]. Even so, the official initiative had to come from above: 
Arctic Council Ministers and their respective Senior Arctic Officials acted on the growing 
concerns over marine oil spills and the potentially severe implications of a marine oil spill in 
the Arctic by establishing a Task Force and directing it to develop an international instrument 
of Arctic marine oil pollution preparedness and response [INF 7]. 
The cooperation came from the top-down [INF 4]. The Arctic Council is taking responsibility; 
it is a goal to secure a sufficient system for oil spill response [INF 4]. 
6.2 Negotiation 
The Task Force was a very important, functional and effective tool to negotiate and sign the 
Agreement in a relatively short time [INF 1, 2, 3]. The Task Force was not really a part of the 
Arctic Council [INF 5]. The activities in the Arctic Council are followed with eagle eyes from 
other countries with interest for the region [INF 5]. Therefore, it was a major concern not to 
give the impression that the AC were taking more than they were entitled to when it comes to 
dividing the Arctic into geographical sectors [INF 5]. 
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By initiating the Agreement the ministerial level had a role in the beginning of the process, 
but during the negotiations it was only given political signals to the Task Force through the 
SAO meetings where the co-chairs participated [INF 3]. The ministerial level contributed with 
the necessary political and administrative support through their representatives in the 
delegations [INF 2].  The initiative to develop an instrument on oil spill response is in tune 
with the professional’s ideal of an OSR system that is as proficient as possible [INF 5]. It was 
not experienced any strong contradictions or hidden agenda among the delegations [INF 6]. 
“No-one is against oil spill response” [INF 6]. Five Task Force meetings were held in Oslo, 
St. Petersburg, Anchorage, Helsinki and Reykjavik [INF 4].  Norway, Russia and the U.S. 
were notable contributors, and co-chaired the Task Force [INF 4]. Norway and Russia were 
taking on leader roles as they are the countries with most activity in today’s Arctic, and the 
Agreement will surely affect this activity [INF 5]. One diplomat from each of the three co-
chairing countries led the negotiation and is, by one informant, characterized as the most 
important actors during the process [INF 3]. They had different roles in the Task Force; the 
American co-chair was a great resource for the group, and he was the one reformulating texts 
to meet compromises [INF 3, 4]. The Russian co-chair had experience from the negotiation of 
the SAR Agreement, and the Norwegian co-chair was a pragmatic compromise maker who 
softened political tension for the purpose of common sense [INF 3]. In addition, the 
Norwegian delegation contributed with texts as foundation for the negotiation [INF 3, 5]. The 
Norwegian draft has been the foundation for the negotiation [INF 6]. The Agreement is built 
on existing agreements [INF 5]. The OPRC convention was used as a starting point, and the 
multilateral agreements; the Copenhagen Agreement and the Bonn Agreement, and bilateral 
agreements between Norway and Russia, and Norway and Britain [INF 5]. The multilateral 
agreements were most useful [INF 5]. The agreement on search and rescue
21
 was looked at for 
the question of geographical scope [INF 5]. This was one of the issues that were discussed a 
lot, in addition to the question of whether the Agreement should be legally binding or not 
[INF 5]. The Norwegian delegation was interested in including the precautionary principle 
and the polluter pays principle into the text of the Agreement, this was also discussed 
extensively [INF 4, 5, 6]. Dialog was used to reach an agreement [INF 4]. “Rome was not 
built in a day, and neither was the oil spill response in the Arctic” [INF 4] At the first meeting 
the delegations accounted for a common understanding of what they wanted to accomplish 
and what was included in the mandate from the Ministerial Meeting [INF 4]. 
                                                 
21
 Legally binding agreement on search and rescue in the Arctic among the same eight states negotiated and 
signed in 2011 two years before the signing of the OSR Agreement. 
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The national delegations to the Task Force were of different sizes, overall it was a significant 
number of people involved [INF 4]. “Each delegation was comprised of various 
professionals” [INF 7]. All delegations involved representatives from national governmental 
OSR organizations [INF 1]. In addition to representatives from the Government of Nunavut, 
who represented the territorial views, the Canadian delegation consisted of federal 
governmental departments with interest in OSR in the Arctic; the Coast Guard, Transport 
Canada, Environment Canada, and the department on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development [INF 7]. Norway’s delegation, who counted twelve people, were from the 
Ministry of Fishery and Costal Affaires, the law department and the department of the High 
North in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Costal Administration
22
, WWF 
Norway, and one consulting firm
23
 [INF 4]. The Russian delegation included representatives 
from the Ministry of Transport, FSB, Gosmorspassluzhba, and the Ministry of Emergency 
Situations (Emercom) [INF 2, 4, 5]. The Russian delegation was the only delegation including 
scientists [INF 2]. The delegation from the United States involved people from the State 
Department, the Costal Guard, and from the state of Alaska [INF 1, 4, 5]. Sweden, Finland, 
and Iceland had smaller delegations [INF 4]. In addition to the national delegations there were 
representatives from WWF International, the University of Alaska, and ITOPF who were 
invited as external experts [INF 1]. ITOPF is the International Tanker Owners Pollution 
Federation, which is a non-profit organization involved in all aspects of preparation and 
response to ship-source oil spills (ITOPF, 2013). ITOPF has a lot of expertise on OSR issues 
[INF 5]. The presence and the active participation of interest organizations, especially ITOPF, 
and the environmental movement, particularly the WWF, should be highlighted as distinct 
features of the negotiation [INF 3]. Additionally, the Permanent Participants are very active in 
this work [INF 4]. Each Head of Delegation were speaking for the delegation, while the 
members whispered in their ears, during the plenary negotiations [INF 6]. At one meeting the 
Task Force was divided into groups to discuss different issues, which worked great according 
to one informant [INF 6]. Long and detailed discussions were carried out [INF 4]. 
The representatives from Norwegian authorities highlights their close coordination with their 
competent national authority; The Norwegian Costal Administration. The threshold for 
contacting them on such issues is considered to be low and it is a good relationship between 
OSR professionals and representatives from ministries [INF 6]. Internationally the 
                                                 
22
 The competent national authority in Norway 
23
 The consulting firm participated at one meeting 
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cooperation between the delegates was more depending on personal relations [INF 6]. “We 
are listening to The Norwegian Costal Administration, and they give us good advice” [INF 6]. 
At ministerial level the negotiations were hardly discussed [INF 3]. Before and in-between the 
rounds of negotiation the Norwegian delegation had close contact with the political level and 
coordinated among different ministries [INF 4].  
To negotiate with key stakeholders Canada held engagement sessions prior to each Task 
Force meeting [INF 7]. Permanente Participants of the Arctic Council, Aboriginal 
organizations, NGOs (e.g. WWF), academic institutions, shipping industry, and experts on 
OSR participated on the meetings [INF 7]. The purpose was to get input from stakeholders for 
the development of the Canadian positions [INF 7]. 
The Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) were informed regularly through reports from the co-
chairs at SAO meetings [INF 1]. SAOs were not involved with the role of being SAOs in the 
Task Force, however, some of the participants may have been SAOs as well as 
representatives, and some were occasionally visiting when Task Force meetings were held in 
their area [INF 4]. To reach an agreement there had to be consensus among the delegations; 
this forced delegations to abandon some issues while agreeing to others to make the 
Agreement possible [INF 4]. It was a number of considerations and the delegations had 
different approaches [INF 4]. Some delegations were concerned of a broad cooperation, while 
others were most occupied with their country’s self-interest [INF 4]. It was obvious that some 
of the delegations had large state machinery at home and that this made the process slower in 
these countries [INF 4]. The lawyers from one delegation were concerned about not binding 
the national budget to obligations in the Agreement, and not shrinking the nation’s scope of 
action [INF 5]. The group of experts on international law was significant for the final result 
[INF 5]. The Task Force was concerned about what implications the Agreement would have 
for the operational work on oil spill response, but it was done a lot of juridical tradeoffs 
during the development [INF 5]. 
EPPR representatives from all Arctic Countries provided technical support to the Task Force 
(EPPR, Jun. 2011: 42). During the course of the negotiation the EPPR discussed issues related 
to the work of the Task Force on meetings: June 2011, October 2011, June 2012 and October 
2012. 
The EPPR provided the Task Force with previous work carried out by the working group that 
could support the work of the Task Force, and names of experts to provide exert advise 
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(EPPR, Oct. 2011: 4). EPPR was tasked by the SAOs to develop Operational Guidelines to 
support the Task Force in March 2012 (EPPR, Jun. 2012: 8). EPPR held a workshop in 
Canada to discuss and complete the OGs in January 2013 (Progress rep. 2011-2013: 3). The 
Operational Guidelines was then submitted to the Task Force (Ibid). 
6.3 Operationalization 
It is important to distinguish the political and the practical cooperation [INF 5]. The 
cooperation was initiated politically, while EPPR is responsible for the practical content [INF 
5]. The national competent authorities are more important subsequently, though important 
questions will always be elevated to the political level [INF 4]. It will be important to keep the 
ministerial level informed of exercises and updates of the OGs etc. after the signing [INF 1]. 
The experts in the EPPR are important for the work on OSR in the Arctic Council and EPPR’s 
work with the Operational Guidelines is important for the implementation of the Agreement, 
and possibly for the conduction of exercises [INF 3, 4, 5, 6]. The EPPR Working Group is 
considered as a well-functioning group of professional experts [INF 4]. EPPR has recently 
been tasked to establish a system for coordination of OSR and SAR exercises, and prepare a 
system for evaluation [INF 1]. While one informant states that: “When the Agreement is 
signed the ministers have, mostly, done their job” [INF 5]. Another remarks that the ministers 
may have an important role in lifting the Agreement within other forums and thereby 
promoting the cooperation in the Arctic as a model for cooperation elsewhere [INF 3]. EPPR 
have discussed procedures for upgrading the OGs: they will upgrade administrative 
information at the first meeting of each year, and on a bi-annual basis they will undertake a 
complete review (EPPR, Jun. 2013: 6). The update will be a standing item on every agenda 
for the first EPPR meeting of the year (Ibid). The first full review of the OGs will be 
conducted in 2015 when the first exercise is completed (EPPR, Nov. 2013: 7). The first 
Exercise will be held in Canada in 2014 (Summary to SAO: 1). 
The operative cooperation has started and the first exercise will be held roughly a year after 
the signing of the Agreement [INF 5]. At the final Task Force meeting, Canada offered to host 
the first international exercise under the Agreement [INF 7]. This is an important opportunity 
to test the effect of the new Agreement and selected components for the OGs [INF 7]. The 
virtual exercise has started and will be performed in three phases, with the intention of 
presenting preliminary findings at the EPPR meeting in June 2014 [INF 7]. 
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The comprehensiveness is important, building agreements in the region “stone by stone” as 
one informant puts it [INF 4]. The EPPR is at the time working on a framework for 
prevention [INF 4], and from earlier the Arctic countries have signed a search and rescue 
agreement in addition to the one on OSR. The cooperation through the Agreement contributes 
to a stronger bilateral cooperation among the Arctic states [INF 5]. 
6.4 Analysis 
Before the analysis, it is important to highlight the fact that the regime formation is an 
ongoing process. The establishment of an oil spill response regime in the Arctic is not 
finalized, and it will be a continuous process by developing the regime over time. “Rome was 
not built in a day, and neither was the oil spill response in the Arctic” [INF 4]. This study is 
just an interpretation on the process from one time in history. In addition, it is important to 
bear in mind the fact that the material, to some degree, is influenced by the biases of the 
informants. Throughout this thesis it is shown a noteworthy presence of professionals in the 
organization of the Arctic Council, and especially in the work with oil spill response. In the 
theory chapter it was accounted for the concept of professionalization of organizations 
(Wilensky, 1964: 141). Professional values may influence policy in organizations that need 
experts, while this is not seen as a threat in organizations were the organizational purpose are 
related to the professional values (Bell, 1985: 22, 56). 
The most striking finding in the first stage of the regime formation is how the idea of the 
establishment on an OSR regime have been proposed earlier [INF 6], while there had to be an 
incident to put the issue in the political agenda. The experience of inadequate routines for 
moving resources across borders which created obstacles for providing international 
assistance, was making it hard not to pursuit these issues politically (EPPR, 2010: 12; [INF 
4]). Several informants expresses that the initiative for the Agreement came from the political 
level in the Arctic Council [INF 4, 5, 7]. A report from the EPPR shows however that the 
issue was discussed among the experts before it was initiated through the Nuuk Declaration 
(EPPR, 2010: 12). It is likely that the U. S. Coast Guard, who proposed for the EPPR to start 
working on issues of international assistance is an essential policy advisor and that the policy 
was formed after their advice as the theory of program professionals proclaims (Wilensky, 
1964: 158). Although, the Deepwater Horizon incident were in itself large enough to force oil 
spill response onto the agenda, the informants are still highlighting that the Agreement was 
initiated from the top-down [INF 4]. The ministers took responsibility [INF 4] and “[…] acted 
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on the growing concerns over marine oil spills and the potentially severe implications of a 
marine oil spill in the Arctic” [INF 7]. During the negotiation stage the evidence shows that it 
was a notable presence of professionals in the national delegations. External experts were also 
participating [INF 1]. Experts from EPPR were present in all delegations, and in-between the 
EPPR discussed issues related to the negotiation (EPPR, Jun. 2010: 42). The ministerial level 
was not directly involved [INF 3], but it seems like the delegations to a large extent was 
directed through their mandate for the negotiations; at least two delegations held sessions in-
between the rounds of negotiation [INF 4, 7]. It is however difficult to be certain of how 
important the OSR professionals were at the negotiation stage. Considering the information 
from the informants it is clearly a significant presence of professionals, and the close 
relationship between the national professionals and the rest of the delegation is highlighted 
[INF 6]. In this delegation it is reflected a mutual trust and reliance among the different 
representatives. The EPPR working group did however provide the Task Force with 
information from earlier projects (EPPR, Oct. 2011: 4), which could be evidence of some sort 
of policy recommendations. One important finding is how one informant remarks the roles of 
professional values by stating that the initiative to develop the Agreement is in tune with a 
professional’s ideal of an OSR system that is as proficient as possible [INF 5]. The theoretical 
framework states that the threat of professional values influencing policy making are not as 
radical when the organizational purpose and professional values are closely linked (Bell, 
1985: 56). It is clear that the cooperation is driven by mutual interests, and the representatives 
clarified a common understanding of what the Task Force was assigned to accomplish [INF 
4]. Still, it was experienced some challenges to reach consensus, but the material dose not 
describe any disagreement between professional and organizational values. The challenges 
were more relating to political agendas. Some delegations were concerned about creation a 
broad cooperation, while others were more concerned about self-interest [INF 4]. One 
delegation was occupied with not creating barriers for national scope of action or binding the 
national budget [INF 5]. It was done a lot of juridical tradeoffs during the negotiation [INF 5]. 
It seems to be the lawyers that prevented the inclusion of some elements into the Agreement. 
The development of the Operational Guidelines and arranging joint exercises are strictly the 
responsibility of the EPPR working group in consultation with competent national authorities 
[INF 1]. It is acknowledged by one informant that it has to be made a distinction between the 
political and the practical operation; the cooperation was initiated politically, while EPPR is 
in charge of the practical content [INF 5]. After the negotiation, in the operationalization stage 
of the regime formation, it is seen as the professionals are getting a larger role in the 
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cooperation. The national competent authorities are more important, subsequently [INF 4], 
although the same informant also noted that any important questions will be taken to the 
political level. The operative cooperation has already started [INF 5, 7]. The 
operationalization stage is likely to be characterized by the influence of the OSR 
professionals, while the regime have certain principles, norms, rules and decision making 
procedures as discussed in chapter 4 who will provide a framework for the development of the 
regime in the time to come. 
Another interesting aspect is the clear parallel from the quote about creating regimes in the 
Arctic by “Building stone by stone” [INF 4] to the regime complex described by Oran Young 
(2012).  
6.5 Summary 
It is not easy to draw any simple conclusion from this material. What is certain is a 
noteworthy presence of oil spill professionals through the different stages of the regime 
formation. It is however also important to note the central role the political level played in the 
initiation part of the development. There was a need for political support to get an Arctic oil 
spill agreement on the agenda. The professional values may seem to be closely linked to the 
purpose of the organization in the negotiation stage. Operationalization will be the main 
responsibility of EPPR and national competent authorities through the updating of the OGs 





This thesis has examined the Arctic states’ Agreement on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness 
and Response in the Arctic. The following three research topics and questions have been 
analyzed: 
1. Regime: what is the structure of the Agreement, what principles, norms, rules and 
decision making procedures dose it establish for the OSR regime? 
2. Response system: to what extent are the agreements under the Arctic OSR regime 
compatible? 
3. The role of politics and professions; to what extent are the political and 
professional representatives influencing different stages in the formation of the 
Agreement? 
The topics may seem diverse, but they are closely linked within the frame of the oil spill 
response regime in the Arctic. The purpose of the Agreement is to create a comprehensive oil 
spill response system in the Arctic.  
7.1 Results 
Guided by the three research questions, and by using relevant data and theoretical framework 
this study have been able to help us better understand the establishment of an oil spill 
response regime in the Arctic. The first question helped us reach a better understanding of the 
principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures in the Arctic oil spill response 
Agreement. This descriptive part of the thesis is important for the overall understanding of the 
establishment of an OSR regime in the region. While the Agreement mostly consists of 
principles and rules for procedures since it is a legal document, it is creating a framework for 
the establishment of a regime. The problem solving model from the chapter on response 
system salutes cooperation between agencies and the personal contact which this type of 
cooperation encourage. So this might be seen as a positive feature of the Arctic Council’s 
institutional framework. The agreements are to a relatively large extent compatible. The most 
important deviations were the sign of centralization in the Canadian-Danish cooperation, and 
the emphasis on cooperation within research. While the political level found it necessary to 
develop an OSR regime after the Deepwater Horizon spill, the negotiation stage of the regime 
formation were a close cooperation between representatives from national ministries and of 
OSR experts. Further, it is the professional’s responsibility to prepare, recommend and 
65 
 
maintain the development of the OSR agreements, operational guidelines, and contingency 
plans, and they are thereby to a large extent responsible for the operationalization of the 
regime. 
7.2 Further Research 
Several subjects for further research have appeared during this study. I will highlight four 
topics which really got my interest. First of all, it is clearly interesting to look more into the 
creation of a regime complex in the Arctic. The developments within governance structures in 
the Arctic region due to the increased interest in the regions potential for economic gains and 
the goal to preserve the vulnerable environment are interesting aspects of current international 
relations. This is a relatively new phenomenon and is relevant for several different 
stakeholders with interest in the region. 
Second, while studying the response system for the region it was desired to study national 
response systems as well as the bilateral and multilateral OSR structures. This would clearly 
have been a larger research project, but the possibility of learning from the different systems 
would have been well worth the effort. The master’s thesis was however, not the time or the 
occasion to conduct such a large project. 
Another aspect of the response systems is the interplay among the cooperation structures; this 
would have been an interesting topic for a more political study. Institutional interplay is, like 
mentioned in the theory; most likely a phenomenon in the OSR regime and this could 
influence the development of the regime over time. 
Finally, the cooperation within the oil spill response regime is obviously influenced by more 
informal forces than the ones accounted for in the section on the role of politics and 
professions. This could have become an interesting study, if a researcher were given the 
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Appendix I: List of Documents 
Table 4: List of documents 
Code Title Origin Type Date 
The Agreement 
(AC, 2013a) 
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Agreement Between Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden about Cooperation 
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the Sea after Contamination by 












(Nor-Rus, 1994) Agreement between the 
Government of the Kingdom of 
Norway and the Government of 
the Russian Federation on 
cooperation to combat oil-spills 
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Government of the Union of 
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the Government of the United 
States of America concerning 
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Pollution in the Bering and 









Joint Contingency Plan Against 




JCP May 1989 
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Appendix II: E-mail to Potential Informants 
Dear Mr. / Ms. 
I'm currently working on my master's thesis on Arctic Council's Agreement on Cooperation 
on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. 
I have studied much of the written material available. Documents are my main source of data 
so much of the work is completed but there are still some questions I would like to get 
answered by informants. 
The informants that I'm looking for are ideally the ones who were working in or close to the 
task force or the EPPR working group with the development of the agreement or the 
maintenance of the guidelines. All the informants will be anonymous in the paper, and I'm the 
only one who will know who attended. 
The thesis has three research topics: regime, response systems and professional influence. 
And it is for the third topic I need data from informants. 
The research question for this part of the thesis is: what drives the cooperation? Is the OSR 
Agreement of the Arctic states understood as a political or a professional area of cooperation? 
And the questions I would like the informants to reflect upon are: 
1. Who were the most important actors during the negotiation and development of the 
Agreement? 
2. How will you describe the role of professionals and scientists in the development of 
the Agreement? 
3. How will you describe the role of the ministers and the Senior Arctic Officials in the 
development of the Agreement? 
4. How important was the Task Force? 
5. In the Task Force on Artic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response; who 
were the most important actors; politicians or experts? 
6. How important was the EPPR working group for the development of the Agreement? 
7. How important is the EPPR working group for the maintenance of the Agreement? 
8. How important is the ministerial level? 
 
I would really appreciate if you could help me with answering these questions. 
If you know of anyone else who might be interested in helping me with information please 
send me their email address or forward this email to them. 
I would be very grateful for any help. 
Best regards, 
 
Ingvild H. Rise 
iri008@post.uit.no 
tel. +47 958 56 550 
Master’s Degree in Societal Safety 
University of Tromsø 
